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The Deconstruction of the Marital Privilege
"... the confidence of the marital relationship... 'the best solace of human
existence.' "1
"We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights-older than our
political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together
for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of be-
ing sacred.' 2
I. INTRODUCTION
Deconstruction is a philosophical position, a political or intellectual
strategy, and a mode of reading. Above all, it is a methodology of ar-
gument, "both rigorous argument within philosophy and displace-
ment of philosophical categories or philosophical attempts at
mastery." 3 The evolution of the marital privilege in American law
has occurred through just such a process. On a case-by-case basis in
1. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) (quoting Stein v. Bowman, 38
U.S. (13 Pet.) 209, 223 (1839)). In Trammel, the Supreme Court established the marital
privilege as it exists today. It affirmed lower courts' rulings that confidential commu-
nications between husband and wife are privileged, but the witness-spouse may neither
be compelled nor foreclosed from testifying. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 53. See infra notes
83-97 and accompanying text.
2. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). In Griswold, the Supreme
Court held a Connecticut statute forbidding the use of contraceptives unconstitutional
because it was an impermissible intrusion upon "an intimate relation of husband and
wife and their physician's role in one aspect of that relation." Id. at 482. See infra
notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
3. J. CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION: THEORY AND CRITICISM AFrER STRUCTURAL-
ISM 85 (1982). In light of this definition of deconstruction, the application of the meth-
ods of deconstruction to the evolution of the common law ought not to seem
surprising. Deconstructive analysis has created controversy in literary studies, where
it currently enjoys great if highly qualified success, precisely because it challenges the
domination of any single canonical meaning. See infra note 8. However, the evolution
of the common law depends upon an entirely self-conscious and deliberate methodol-
ogy that proceeds by displacement of prior definitions, reached by rigorous argument
within the context of those definitions.
Two debts should be acknowledged at the onset of this endeavor. I am indebted to
Professor Homer Obed Brown of the University of California, Irvine, for discussions
about deconstruction in the context of contemporary literary theory. I am indebted
also to Special Attorneys Geoffrey A. Anderson, Laurence R. Leavitt, and Stanley W.
Parry of the United States Department of Justice for the opportunity to see first-hand
the invocation, scope, and limitations of the present-day marital privilege in a federal
court. See infra note 176. The conflation of deconstruction and the marital privilege is
my own; none of these gentlemen is in any way liable for the discussion and analysis
which follows here.
the light of reason and experience, 4 each articulation and definition
of the marital privilege has resulted from rigorous argument within
the confines of common law. Yet, within each case's varying factual
circumstance, the courts have successively displaced prior philosophi-
cal categories and philosophical attempts at mastery.
The consequent status of the marital privilege today has been most
often seen as the virtual destruction and disappearance of the marital
privilege--or at least its devolution into two incompatible, mutually
exclusive, and strictly limited privileges: the adverse spousal testi-
mony privilege and the confidential marital communication privilege.
Both privileges are commonly presumed to be subject to further dim-
inution, if not outright disappearance, in terms of practical efficacy. 5
However, an examination of the marital privilege since Trammel v.
United States6 in 1980 reveals that it has in fact persisted, and has
done so as an increasingly coherent and unified privilege.7 The pro-
cess of deconstruction is not the process of destruction, nor does the
displacement of the philosophical categories or attempts at mastery
that are the presuppositions of definitions or articulations of the mar-
ital privilege invalidate either the privilege, or the method of analysis
by which it has been formulated. What has occurred has not been
the invalidation of the marital privilege, but rather a process of
deconstructive resolution.8
4. See infra notes 25, 68, 80-82 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., United States v. Neal, 743 F.2d 1441, 1444 (10th Cir. 1984) (citing the
trial court's comment that "as a practical matter, the United States Supreme Court in
Trammel . . . may have intended to eliminate the communication privilege alto-
gether"); United States v. Jones, 683 F.2d 817, 818 (4th Cir. 1982) (Trammel operates
"to narrow, not expand, the scope of marital testimonial privilege"); United States v.
Tsinnijinnie, 601 F.2d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 966 (1979) (movement
has been toward restriction of marital privilege, which has been singled out for partic-
ularly harsh criticism). See also C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
§§ 66, 86 (2d ed. 1972) (criticizing both privileges); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2228 (rev.
ed. 1961) (disapproving the adverse spousal testimony privilege as "illogical and un-
founded"); Haney, The Evolutionary Development of Marital Privileges in Federal
Criminal Trials: Constricting the Invocation and Growth of Spousal Privileges in Fed-
eral Criminal Cases by Interpreting the Common Law in the "Light of Reason and Ex-
perience," 6 NAT'L J. CRIM. DEF. 99 (1980) (federal courts' historical inclination to limit
or even eliminate such exclusionary devices as the marital privilege); Purdy, The Mari-
tal Privilege: A Prosecutor's Perspective, 18 CRIM. L. BULL. 309, 309 (1982) ("In recent
years the privilege has been viewed with greater skepticism as courts try to weigh the
importance of the marital relationship against the society's interest in obtaining testi-
monial evidence"); Comment, The Husband-Wife Privileges of Testimonial Non-Dis-
closure, 56 Nw. U.L. REV. 208, 230 (1961) (protection of marital communications a
worthy end, but privilege with respect to adverse spousal testimony incapable of sur-
viving close and critical analysis); Note, Expanded Waiver of Marital Privileges in
Missouri, 47 Mo. L. REV. 888, 892 (1982) ("The development of the rules of evidence
has resulted in waning support for these privileges").
6. 445 U.S. 40 (1979). See infra notes 83-97 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 182-95 and accompanying text.
8. Johnson, Translator's Introduction, in J. DERRIDA, DISSEMINATION vii (1981).
The deconstructive critique
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Deconstruction is "an analysis that focuses on the grounds of [a]
system's possibility. The critique reads backwards . . . to show . . .
that the starting point is not a (natural) given but a (cultural) con-
struct, usually blind to itself."9 On a case-by-case basis, each succes-
sive ruling on a marital privilege is a critique of prior rulings, reading
backwards to find a ground in the given common law for an unequiv-
ocal definition of that privilege. That ruling in turn, either as binding
or persuasive authority, becomes part of the common law, a starting
point for each succeeding argument in each succeeding case that is no
more natural than its predecessors. Rather it is a cultural con-
struct-a cultural construct, moreover, that is blind to itself.
In this deconstructive process is the key to the evolution of the
marital privilege and its present status. The marital privilege ostensi-
bly arose from the common law disqualification of interested parties,
a rhetorical ground which has disappeared for all intents and pur-
poses from case law.1O The cultural institution of marriage itself has
become increasingly beseiged by changing social mores.
The marital privilege, however, has not disappeared, nor is it likely
to do so in the future. This is because it is phenomenologically
grounded in the marital relationship itself: "those peculiarly confi-
does not ask "what does this statement mean?" but "where is it being made
from? What does it presuppose? Are its presuppositions compatible with, in-
dependent of, and anterior to the statement that seems to follow from them,
or do they already follow from it, contradict it, or stand in a relation of mu-
tual dependence such that neither can exist without positing that the other is
prior to it?"
Id, at xv. Meaning is not destroyed by deconstruction, but rather, "the claim of une-
quivocal domination of one meaning over another." Id. at xiv. A text, therefore, has
more than one meaning, and the meanings vary and may be explicated from the text
in accordance with its presuppositions, the ground of the argument the text makes.
"Sometimes the discrepancy is produced ... by a double edged phrase that both artic-
ulates and breaks open the explicit statement being made . . . sometimes it occurs
when the so-called starting point of an argument is based on presuppositions that
render its conclusions problematic or circular." Id. at xiv-xv. But neither the state-
ment being made nor the conclusions of the argument are thereby invalidated in them-
selves.
A classic instance of deconstructive analysis, the Nietzchean deconstruction of cau-
sality, will illustrate this. One feels an effect-pain-and looks for a cause-for exam-
ple, a pin-and, positing the link, reverses the phenomenal order (pain, pin) to produce
the rhetorical sequence (pin, pain) denominated causation. In the rhetorical tradition,
cause (pin) is an origin, logically and temporally prior to effect (pain). Deconstruction
discovers that the effect is phenomenally prior to its cause, and therefore equally is
cause, and origin. However, causation is not thereby invalidated; it is as indispensible
to the deconstructive analysis as it is to the traditional rhetorical formulation. The
Neitzchean example of deconstruction is drawn from CULLER, supra note 3, at 86-88.
9. Johnson, supra note 8, at xv.
10. See infra notes 20-21, 37 and accompanying text.
dential relations" of husband and wife;" "a right of privacy older
than the Bill of Rights. . .intimate to the degree of being sacred;"'12
the relationship that is "the best solace of human existence."13 These
phrases are quoted from Supreme Court opinions spanning nearly a
century. Stated in the terms of deconstructive analysis, the privilege
has persisted because it was and is phenomenally prior to its ground
in the cultural construct, and therefore is equally the cause and ori-
gin of its successive definitions. Each successive definition was ar-
rived at by the deconstruction of the prior definitions, involving the
explicit criticism and disapproval of the cultural constructs which
were its rhetorical grounds.
With the erosion of the first cultural constructs, the marital privi-
lege may have appeared to devolve and fragment into limited and
separate privileges. However, in this deconstructive process, the mar-
ital privilege has been the persistent fertile ground from which a new
cultural construct is emerging. This emergent construct is poten-
tially rhetorical ground and logical cause for the marital privilege in
the future, and for other privileges beyond the marital privilege. In
addition, freed from the burden of argument and rationalization
based on an outmoded cultural construct, the marital privilege itself
has emerged as increasingly coherent and unified.
The phrase that has been the hallmark of the marital privilege
since Benson v. United States, the "peculiarly confidential relations"
of husband and wife,14 epitomizes the deconstructive process. It is an
explicit statement that rhetorically and logically follows on the com-
mon law doctrine of disqualification and the cultural institution of
marriage, as the culturally defined bases for that disqualification.
Those cultural constructs are its explicit presuppositions. Based
solely on those cultural constructs, the marital privilege is now prob-
lematical. However, the meaning of the phrase, "the peculiarly confi-
dential relationship of husband and wife," cannot be unequivocally
linked to those cultural constructs, nor has it been so linked in the
case law in which the marital privilege has been defined and rede-
fined since Benson. This phrase has also signified the phenomenolog-
ical grounds of an emergent cultural construct, the right to privacy. 15
This comment focuses on the persistence of the marital privilege-
11. Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 337 (1892). See infra notes 16-23 and
accompanying text.
12. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486. See infra notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
13. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51 (quoting Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 209, 223
(1839)). See infra notes 83-97 and accompanying text.
14. Benson, 146 U.S. at 337. See infra notes 16-23 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 193-95 and accompanying text. See generally Warren & Bran-
deis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890). The right to privacy has devel-
oped into an increasingly important doctrine from its beginnings in that article to one
of constitutional dimensions.
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in the expansion, contraction and shifting of the scope of the privi-
lege in its case-by-case evolution. What follows here is the tracing of
the marital privilege from its first modern American formulation in
Benson, through its devolution into "two privileges," and its
reemergence, since Trammel in 1980, as a single phenomenological
formulation. The emphasis is on the present status of the privilege as
defined in the cases decided since Trammel under the authority of
Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. At this point, five years
after that decision, this comment is intended to delineate the marital
privilege's present invocation, scope, and limitations, and to suggest
its future evolution.
II. REASON, EXPERIENCE AND THE PECULIARLY CONFIDENTIAL
RELATIONS OF HUSBAND AND WIFE
A. Benson, Funk, and Wolfie
The present day marital privilege under Rule 501 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence is rooted in three Supreme Court cases: Benson v.
United States,16 in 1892; Funk v. United States,17 in 1933; and Wolfle
v. United States,1S in 1934.
. "[fIn the light of general authority and sound reason,"'19 the
Supreme Court in Benson reexamined the long-standing common law
rule of disqualification for interest 20 which was the basis of declaring
spouses incompetent to testify in matters affecting each other:
[S]teadily, one by one, the merely technical barriers which excluded witnesses
from the stand have been removed, till now it is generally, though perhaps
not universally, true that no one is excluded therefrom unless the lips of the
originally adverse party are closed by death, or unless some one of those pecu-
liarly confidential relations, like that of husband and wife, forbids the break-
ing of silence.2 1
16. 146 U.S. 325 (1892).
17. 290 U.S. 371 (1933).
18. 291 U.S. 7 (1934).
19. Benson, 146 U.S. at 335.
20. The early common law development of the marital disqualification for interest
and spousal incompetency is discussed at length in a number of authorities and arti-
cles. See generally McCoRMIcK, supra note 5, at §§ 66, 79; WIGMORE, supra note 5, at
§§ 2227, 2228; Haney, supra note 5, at 232-35; Comment, The Spousal Testimonial Priv-
ilege after Trammel v. United States, 58 DEN. L.J. 357, 358-60 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as Comment, The Spousal Testimonial Privilege]; Comment, supra note 5, at 208-10;
Note, The Privilege Against Adverse Spousal Testimony Extended to Include Indirect
Implications, 13 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 123, 124-26 (1982).
21. Benson, 146 U.S. at 337. The Supreme Court affirmed defendant Benson's con-
viction for murder. He had been tried in federal court because the murder was com-
mitted on a federal reservation.
On the basis of this reexamination, the Court held, contrary to an-
cient practice, that the testimony of a codefendent was competent,
but that a defendant's wife "was not a competent witness for any
purpose whatever against her husband, even though she might be
willing to testify."22 The Court's language here suggests the tradi-
tional rationale of incompetence, but the Court's action in the case
foreshadows the development of a marital privilege rather than a
rule of disqualification. It also foreshadows subsequent holdings
which would limit that privilege's application. The Court refused to
reverse the defendant's conviction, even though his wife testified to
the contents of confidential letters from defendant to her, because
the defendant waived his right to object to her testimony by not do-
ing so at the time.23
The next significant step in the definition of the marital privilege
was taken by the Supreme Court in Funk v. United States in 1933,
where the Court, citing Benson among other cases, held that the wife
of a defendant in a criminal trial is competent to testify on his be-
half.24 Citing Funk the next year in Wolfle v. United States, the
Court used the phrase since embedded in the Federal Rules gov-
erning the marital privilege: the "rules governing the competence of
witnesses ... are governed by common law principles as interpreted
and applied by the federal courts in the light of reason and experi-
ence."25 The Court went on to provide a privilege protecting marital
confidences which was to be differentiated from a continuing right of
either spouse to exclude the testimony of the other:
The basis of the immunity given to communications between husband and
wife is the protection of marital confidences, regarded as so essential to the
preservation of the marriage relationship as to outweigh the disadvantages to
the administration of justice which the privilege entails. Hence it is that the
privilege with respect to communications extends to the testimony of husband
or wife even though the different privilege, excluding the testimony of one
against the other, is not involved.
2 6
22. Id. at 327.
23. Id. at 332-33. The Court noted that defendant Benson's counsel in fact had
suggested the letters' mode of admission, and found that counsel's objection by motion
to strike "long after its admission ... was too late." Id. at 332.
24. Funk, 290 U.S. at 381. The Supreme Court reversed a conviction for conspir-
acy to violate prohibition laws because the defendant's wife had been barred from tes-
tifying on his behalf. Id. at 386-87. In so doing, the Court noted that Benson
"reject[ed] the notion ... that the courts. . . are still chained to the ancient formulae
and are powerless to declare and enforce modifications deemed to have been wrought
in the common law itself by force of these changed conditions." Id. at 379.
25. Wofe, 291 U.S. at 12 (citing Funk, 290 U.S. 371 (1933)). See infra notes 68, 80-
82 and accompanying text. In Wotle, the Court held that the contents of a letter from
the defendant husband to his wife, dictated to a stenographer, could be testified to by
the stenographer in a criminal prosecution. The marital privilege was held not to ex-
clude testimony of a third person with whose participation the communication was
made. Wotfie, 291 U.S. at 15.
26. Id. at 14 (citations omitted). The Court noted that privately-made communica-
tions between spouses generally are assumed to have been intended to be confidential,
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The Court made it clear that it was Benson's peculiarly confidential
relations that were privileged. Excluded from its protection were
communications made in the presence of third parties, even those
communications made "in the presence of their children .... "27
For forty-five years subsequent to Funk and Wolfle, the marital
privilege evolved as two separate and distinct privileges. Although
the Court in Wolfle referred to two privileges-a privilege for confi-
dential communications, and a privilege, vested in either spouse, to
exclude adverse spousal testimony--only the evolution of the confi-
dential marital communications exclusion was grounded consistently
in the rationale of privilege. The exclusion of confidential marital
communications was limited to those instances where the peculiarly
confidential relations of husband and wife clearly provided the con-
text, with the power to waive the privilege residing with the maker
of the communication. The exclusion of adverse testimony continued
to be grounded, albeit not exclusively, in the rationale of spousal in-
competence. As might be expected, the divergent grounds resulted in
divergent definitions of the marital privilege, and in conflict within
the evolution of the exclusion of adverse spousal testimony.
In the language of deconstruction, the phrase provided by the
Supreme Court in Benson, the "peculiarly confidential relations" of
husband and wife, is a double-edged phrase that both articulates the
traditional ground of incompetence, and opens a new ground of privi-
leged confidentiality.28 The privilege to exclude the adverse spousal
testimony continued to be based, until Trammel v. United States, in
the common law doctrine of incompetence, a cultural construct disap-
proved in nearly every case by courts which nonetheless approved,
however uneasily, the exclusion of adverse spousal testimony. In
contrast, the privilege for confidential marital communications
evolved relatively smoothly and consistently, based on an emergent
cultural construct whose existence, if not scope, was unquestioned.
Thus, as early as 1942, "confidential revelations between husband
and wife"29 were cited as an example of the right of personal privacy
and hence, privileged. However, the Court explicitly left undecided whether the privi-
lege excludes proof of communications between them, however confidential, by a wit-
ness who is neither the husband nor the wife. Id. at 13.
27. Id. at 17. The Court emphasized that the "privilege suppresses relevant testi-
mony and should be allowed only when it is plain that marital confidence can not
otherwise reasonably be preserved." Id.
28. See supra note 8.
29. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 141 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
Justice Murphy dissented from the Supreme Court majority's holding that the use of a
guaranteed by the fourth amendment, "[o]ne of the great boons se-
cured to the inhabitants of this country by the Bill of Rights ....
Equally early, the confidential marital communications privilege
could be waived by the communicating spouse, even over the objec-
tions of the marital partner.3 1 Even the grand jury was not permit-
ted to breach the private character of marital communications.3 2
The courts' definition of the confidential marital communications
privilege was consistent throughout the period prior to Trammel,33
and indeed has continued to be consistent up to the present. The
privilege protects private marital speech or communicative acts in-
tended by one spouse to convey a message to the other:34 communi-
cations made in confidence, neither to nor in the presence of third
parties.3 5 The scope of the communications privilege has similarly
reflected the privilege's ground in the peculiarly confidential rela-
detectaphone (an early ancestor of electronic eavesdropping) was not violative of the
defendant's fourth amendment rights. In protesting the Court's approval of "the reve-
lation of thoughts uttered within the sanctity of private quarters" he cited "the most
confidential revelations between husband and wife" as an example of what the Court's
decision threatened. Id.
30. Id. at 136.
31. Fraser v. United States, 145 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 849
(1945) (affirming liability of purchasers of non-quota cotton for penalties prescribed by
the Agriculture Adjustment Act of 1938, where husband and wife, both defendants,
testified to confidential communications between themselves). The court stated,
"Moreover, the privilege that attaches to confidential communications between hus-
band and wife may be waived, and the waiver belongs to the communicating spouse,
the addressee of the communication not being entitled to object." Id. at 144 (citation
omitted).
32. Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332 (1951). The Supreme Court held that a hus-
band was privileged to refuse to disclose the whereabouts of his wife to a grand jury
which had subpoenaed her as a witness in an investigation of the Communist Party.
Id. at 333-34.
33. See generally Comment, supra note 5, at 216-28 (discussing "the most widely
accepted" marital privilege).
34. The marital communications privilege "applies only to utterances or expres-
sions intended to be communicative." United States v. Ferris, 719 F.2d 1405, 1408 (9th
Cir. 1983) (citing United States v. Lefkowitz, 618 F.2d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 824 (1980)) (wife's testimony concerning observations of drugs in defendant's
car not excluded by marital confidential communications privilege). The privilege also
does not preclude compulsion of a defendant's spouse's fingerprints, United States v.
Thomann, 609 F.2d 560, 564 (1st Cir. 1979), or handwriting exemplars, United States v.
McKeon, 558 F. Supp. 1243, 1247 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
35. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 6 (1954) (no error in admission of victim's
testimony in trial of defendant who had married a wealthy widow in a scheme to de-
fraud). The Court held that the presumption of confidentiality of marital communica-
tions is negated by the presence of a third party, and generally extends only to
utterances, not to acts. Id. See supra note 25. See also Wolfle, 291 U.S. at 16-17.
See also United States v. McCown, 711 F.2d 1441, 1452-53 (9th Cir. 1983) (a wife's
testimony that her defendant husband had privately instructed her to write a check
not excluded by the marital confidential communications privilege). Given independ-
ent testimony that the husband gave the check to a third party to use in a criminal
transaction, the court found in McCown that the circumstances indicated the husband
"did not intend the instruction to his wife to write the check to be confidential." Id. at
1452.
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tions of husband and wife. Marital communications which have to do
with a crime against the marriage relationship or with the commis-
sion of a crime in which both spouses were participants do not fall
within the protection of the privilege, because such communications,
however confidential, have nothing to do with the marital relation
and indeed are antithetical to it.36
B. Hawkins and its Consequences
The evolution of the adverse testimony privilege has been neither
consistent nor unconflicted. The Supreme Court in Funk37 had abol-
ished common law incompetency barring spousal testimony on behalf
of a defendant spouse. However, the Funk opinion left the bar of
spousal incompetency undisturbed with respect to adverse testimony.
In 1958, in Hawkins v. United States, the Supreme Court reaf-
firmed "the phase of the common-law rule which allowed either
spouse to exclude adverse testimony by the other."38 While the deci-
sion in Hawkins ostensibly ruled on a question of privilege only,39
the Court's reasoning grounded the "privilege" in the common law
rule that husband and wife were incompetent as witnesses for or
36. See, e.g., United States v. Price, 577 F.2d 1356, 1364-65 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 1068 (1979) (where husband and wife are engaged in criminal conspiracy
to transport women interstate for purposes of prostitution, the statement of either
made in furtherance of the crime may be admitted against the other); United States v.
Mendoza, 574 F.2d 1373, 1380 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 988 (1978) (otherwise
confidential revelations "having to do with the commission of a crime and not with the
privacy of the marriage itself do not fall within the privilege's protection."); United
States v. Kahn, 471 F.2d 191, 194 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973), rev'd
on other grounds, 415 U.S. 143 (1974) ("If the intercepted communications [between
husband and wife] had to do with the commission of a crime and not with the privacy
of the Kahn marriage, . . . 'even the most expansive of the marriage privileges should
not prevent testimony' ") (quoting Note, Future Crime or Tort Exception to Communi-
cations Privilege, 77 HARV. L. REV. 730, 734 (1964)).
37. See supra notes 20-21, 24 and accompanying text.
38. 358 U.S. 74, 76 (1958). In Hawkins, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction
of the defendant for violations of the Mann Act in transporting a woman interstate for
purposes of prostitution, because of the trial court's admission of the wife's ostensibly
voluntary testimony over the defendant's objection. The witness-spouse was not the
victim of the crime within the statutory definition of the Mann Act. Compare infra
notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
It is the right of the party spouse to invoke the "privilege" that exposes its ground-
ing in incompetency, rather than privilege. At common law, the rule of incompetency
required the party to object to the introduction of evidence. MCCORMICK, supra note
5, at § 66.
39. Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525, 528 n.4 (1960) ("Funk v. United States
... abolished, for the federal courts, the disqualification or incompetence of the
spouse as a witness, thus establishing the admissibility of his or her testimony, and
leaving the question [for Hawkins] one of privilege only"). But see supra note 38.
against each other, even if either wished to testify.40 The "privilege"
was couched in the language of the common law disqualification:
Over the years the rule has evolved from the common law absolute disqualifi-
cation to a rule which bars the testimony of one spouse against the other un-
less both consent .... [W]e are unable to subscribe to the idea that an
exclusionary rule based on the persistent instincts of several centuries should
now be abandoned. 4 1
The Court recognized that disqualification, the original reason for
barring favorable testimony of spouses, had long been abolished, but
insisted on a "basic reason" for the retention of the rule barring ad-
verse spousal testimony as "necessary to foster family peace" and
"family harmony."42
The government's argument in Hawkins, that voluntary testimony
is a strong indication that the marriage no longer exists, was far
closer to the Court's hallmark formulation in Benson which
grounded the marital privilege in the peculiarly confidential relations
of husband and wife.43 Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion pro-
vided the better rationale for the Hawkins decision, not only restat-
ing succinctly the government's proposal for a marital privilege, but
also forecasting with remarkable accuracy the chief problem that def-
inition of the marital privilege would present to the courts more than
twenty years later.
Justice Stewart began by identifying the rule against adverse
spousal testimony as "the product of a conceptualism long ago dis-
carded . . .universally criticized by scholars, and .. .qualified or
abandoned in many jurisdictions.... ":
Surely "reason and experience" require that we do more than indulge in mere
assumptions, perhaps naive assumptions, as to the importance of this ancient
rule to the interests of domestic tranquillity.
In the present case, however, the Government . . .ask[s] only to hold that
the privilege is that of the witness and not the accused. Under such a rule the
40. Hawkins, 358 U.S. at 75.
41. Id. at 78-79.
42. Id. at 77. The Court continued:
[A] belief [that such a policy was necessary] has never been unreasonable and
is not now. Moreover, it is difficult to see how family harmony is less dis-
turbed by a wife's voluntary testimony against her husband than by her com-
pelled testimony. In truth, it seems probable that much more bitterness
would be engendered by voluntary testimony than by that which is compelled.
But the Government argues that the fact a husband or wife testifies against
the other voluntarily is strong indication that the marriage is already gone.
Doubtless this is often true. But not all marital flare-ups in which one spouse
wants to hurt the other are permanent.
Id.
43. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. In Hawkins, the government asked
that the Court "modify the rule so that while a husband or wife will not be compelled
to testify against the other, either will be free to do so voluntarily." Hawkins, 358 U.S.
at 77. The government argued that the common law development could be explained
and its policies fully vindicated by recognizing a privilege of the witness, rather than
an outmoded bar declaring the witness incompetent. See Wyatt, 362 U.S. at 528-29
(discussion of the government's argument in the Hawkins brief).
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defendant in a criminal case could not prevent his wife from testifying against
him, but she could not be compelled to do SO.4 4
The Justice concurred in the Court's decision, although he noted that
the facts of the case suggested that no viable marriage relationship
existed. The reason for his concurrence was that the facts also sug-
gested that the testimony in question was scarcely voluntary, raising
the further question as to a rule of voluntariness, which would be
"difficult to administer and easy to abuse." 45
The Supreme Court's definition in Hawkins of an adverse spousal
testimony privilege, or more correctly, a continuing bar to adverse
spousal testimony, only exacerbated the universal criticism and con-
flicting applications to which Justice Stewart referred in his concur-
ring opinion. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion is an exemplary
deconstructive analysis of the Court's definition of this aspect of the
marital privilege. In effect, he states that the Court's reassertion of a
"conceptualism long ago discarded" rendered its conclusion problem-
atic.46 The troubled consequences of Hawkins' problematic privilege
were not long in emerging in the lower courts' attempts at defining
the marital privilege.
The reluctance of the courts to apply a testimonial privilege whose
antecedents had been so universally disapproved resulted in a
proliferation of restrictions on the invocation of the adverse spousal
testimony bar. Within two years of Hawkins, the Supreme Court
held, in Wyatt v. United States,47 not only that a defendant could be
refused the general privilege of excluding his wife's testimony in a
Mann Act prosecution, but also that the wife could be compelled to
testify. The Court refused to allow a defendant who had committed
an offense against the marriage relation itself to invoke "an interest
founded on the marital relation or the desire of the law to protect
it."48 For the compulsion of the wife's testimony, the Court found a
basis in "congressional judgment and policy embodied in the Mann
Act."49 However, for the refusal to allow the defendant the adverse
44. Hawkins, 358 U.S. at 81-82 (footnote omitted) (Stewart, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 82-83. See infra notes 98-115 and accompanying text.
46. Compare supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
47. 362 U.S. 525 (1960). In Wyatt, the Court affirmed the defendant's conviction
for knowingly transporting a woman interstate for purposes of prostitution, upholding
the trial court's compelled testimony of the woman, who had married the defendant
subsequent to the offense ant prior to the trial. Id. at 526 n.1.
48. Id. at 527. The Court based its holding on reaffirming, post-Hawkins, a com-
mon law exception to the marital privilege long recognized in the case of certain kinds
of offenses, including specifically Mann Act offenses. Id. at 526.
49. Id. at 530. The Court continued: "Applying the legislative judgment underly-
testimony bar, the Court relied not on the questionable family har-
mony rationale of Hawkins, but directly on the absence of the mari-
tal relation, even referring to the Government's argument in
Hawkins as a justification for the holding.50
A legally valid marriage has long been recognized by the courts as
a precondition for the existence of any marital privilege.51 The
courts have also refused to accord the protection of the marital privi-
lege to otherwise valid marriages that are "sham" marriages, entered
into for fraudulent purposes, including the purpose of excluding
spousal testimony.5 2 However, in the wake of Hawkins, courts held
that the adverse testimony should also be admitted where the mar-
riage, while existent, was no longer viable.53
ing the Act, we are led to hold it not an allowable choice for a prostituted witness-wife
'voluntarily' to decide to protect her husband by declining to testify against him." Id.
50. Id. at 528-29. See also supra note 43 and accompanying text.
51. United State v. Snyder, 707 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1983) ("Testimonial privilege be-
tween husband and wife requires a valid marriage relationship. It does not include sit-
uations in which the parties were merely living together."); United States v. Lustig,
555 F.2d 737 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 926 (1977) (both adverse spousal testi-
mony privilege and confidential marital communications privilege "depend on the
existence of a valid marriage, as determined by state law. [citations omitted] Common
law marriage is not valid under Alaska law."); United States v. White, 545 F.2d 1129
(8th Cir. 1976) (defendant and witness-wife not married according to the law of Arkan-
sas, and no evidence that they had ever lived together in a state where common law
marriage might be recognized); United States v. Panetta, 436 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. Pa.),
affd, 568 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1977) (test whether valid marriage existed is not whether
parties to allegedly valid marriage believed that they were validly married, but
whether in law they were validly married).
52. Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 615 (1953) ("In a sham, phony, empty
ceremony such as the parties went through in this case, the reason for the rule disqual-
ifying a spouse from giving testimony disappears, and with it the rule."); United States
v. Saniti, 604 F.2d 603, 604 n.1 (9th Cir. 1979) ("Marital privilege is not available when,
as here, the purpose of the marriage was for the purpose of invoking the marital privi-
lege."); United States v. Apodaca, 522 F.2d 568 (10th Cir. 1975) (marital privilege may
not be invoked where marriage of witness to defendant three days prior to trial was
fraudulent, spurious, and not entered into in good faith).
53. Following Hawkins, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the adverse
spousal testimony exclusion, refusing "to condition the privilege ... on a judicial de-
termination that the marriage is a happy or successful one." United States v. Lilley,
581 F.2d 182, 189 (8th Cir. 1978). In Lilley, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed the defendant wife's conviction because her husband was allowed to testify that
she, rather than he, had forged the instrument at issue in the trial. The court reversed
despite the fact that the defendant referred to her husband as her ex-husband, and dis-
claimed any continuing marital relationship, presumably on the basis that the legality
of their marriage was undisputed. Id. at 185 n.1. But see United States v. Brown, 605
F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1979), where the Eighth Circuit's holding is consistent with the more
common practice:
The higher-than-truth value served by the privilege before us is the protection
of the marital bond. Where, as here, [the witness] was with her husband for
two weeks and had not seen him for the entire eight months between his leav-
ing her and the date of the trial, it is difficult to visualize how preservation of
that value would have required [her] total exclusion . . .from the witness
stand.
Id. at 396.
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The decisions admitting adverse spousal testimony were grounded
most often in findings that the substantive marital relationship which
would justify exclusion did not exist. In United States v. Cameron,54
the court admitted adverse spousal testimony, stating that reason and
experience indicated that traditional policy reasons were nonexistent
in the circumstances of the case. Although the continuation of an ex-
clusionary rule in Hawkins was duly noted in the decision,55 the
court found that in spite of the legal existence of the marriage, it had
expired as a social fact.56 Cameron is characteristic of other court de-
cisions that begin a privilege analysis by referring to Hawkins, and a
privilege that "is what remains of the old common law rule that a
spouse was incompetent as a witness for or against the other spouse
based on the legal fiction that husband and wife were one person."57
The courts then state that the adverse testimony is voluntary, and no
otherwise confidential communications are involved.58 Citing these
factual circumstances, the courts base their refusal to exclude ad-
verse spousal testimony directly and explicitly on the absence of the
marital relationship which alone would justify its exclusion.59
54. 556 F.2d 752 (5th Cir. 1977). In Cameron, the defendant's wife had voluntarily
testified against her husband in his trial for interstate transportation of a stolen auto-
mobile. On appeal, the court found that the evidence supported a finding that the
marriage was no longer viable, and its members had little hope or desire for
reconciliation:
There was no residence at which both spouses lived; there was a great dispar-
ity between the amount of time that the couple cohabited and the time that
one or the other chose not to live together; the husband had a more perma-
nent living arrangement with another partner than with his spouse and, in-
deed, fathered a child with that person. All these factors cumulatively signify
a marriage that was moribund.
Id, at 756.
55. The court in Cameron cited the Supreme Court's opinion in Hawkins to sup-
port its defiance of the Court's holding in that case. It stated that the Supreme Court's
decision was not intended to foreclose further changes in the rule dictated by reason
and experience, but rather placed on the courts the responsibility of examining the
policies behind the federal common law privileges so as to alter or amend them. Id. at
755-56.
56. Van Drunen, 501 F.2d at 1396.
57. Lustig, 555 F.2d at 747. See, e.g., United States v. Benford, 457 F. Supp. 589,
597 (E.D. Mich. 1978) ("The privilege to prevent one's spouse from testifying is a left-
over from the ancient common law disqualification of interested witnesses.").
58. See, e.g., Cameron, 556 F.2d at 756; Lustig, 555 F.2d at 748; Benford, 457 F.
Supp. at 598. The Supreme Court's decision to compel adverse spousal testimony in
Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525 (1960), was based on statutory grounds unique to
the Mann Act. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
59. See, e.g., Cameron, 556 F.2d at 756; Benford 457 F. Supp. at 598 ("The testi-
mony of a willing wife who has filed the original complaint against her husband is
hardly likely to do more to upset a marital relationship than already has been done.").
Other means by which courts subsequent to Hawkins found ad-
verse spousal testimony admissible also were based on the concept of
the privilege accorded the confidential marital relationship. Drawing
an analogy to the exceptions to the confidential marital communica-
tions privilege, the court in United States v. Van Drunen limited the
privilege to bar adverse spousal testimony to "those cases where it
makes most sense, namely, where a spouse who is neither a victim
nor a participant observes evidence of the other spouses's [sic]
crime." 60 While acknowledging that "the two marital privileges must
'be sharply distinguished,'" the court stated that the policy support-
ing both is the same: "The underlying reason for both privileges is to
preserve the family."61 Using similar reasoning, the court in United
States v. Allery also refused to exclude adverse spousal testimony
where the crime was an offense against a child or stepchild of the
family unit.62 Noting that the general rule as formulated in Hawkins
was widely criticized, the court found that the offense was an offense
against the family as well as society, and the voluntary adverse testi-
mony of the defendant's spouse was admissible. 63
The lengths to which the courts were willing to go, despite Haw-
kins, in order to follow the dictates of reason and experience and
ground the marital privilege in the peculiarly confidential relations
of husband and wife are illustrated in Ryan v. Commissioner.64 The
court not only allowed but compelled spousal testimony in Ryan, de-
spite an unquestionably valid and vital marriage. The court rejected
Hawkins on the grounds (unique to this case) that the family har-
mony needed no protection. Its decision was based on two findings:
(1) the privacy interests of husband and wife were not at stake, since
60. United States v. Van Drunen, 501 F.2d 1393, 1397 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1091 (1974). The court in Van Drunen affirmed the conviction of the defendant
for illegal transportation of aliens, and refused to bar the testimony of the defendant's
wife, whose transportation was the subject of one count of the indictment. Acknowl-
edging that "Hawkins. .. is arguably a barrier to the result reached today," the Sev-
enth Circuit court nonetheless stated: "We do not view Hawkins as controlling.., we
decline to read the Hawkins opinion as foreclosing the possiblity of other exceptions
not discussed therein." Id. at 1396-97. Compare supra note 36 and accompanying text.
61. Van Drunen, 501 F.2d at 1396.
62. 526 F.2d 1362 (8th Cir. 1975). The court in Alleny affirmed the defendant's
conviction for attempted rape of his daughter, finding that the trial court did not err in
permitting his wife's testimony concerning his sexual misconduct towards their
children.
63. Id. at 1365-66.
64. 568 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1977). In Ryan, culminating eight years of litigation con-
cerning federal income tax assessments, husband and wife appealed a contempt order
imposed for their refusal to answer interrogatories propounded by the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue. The court affirmed the contempt judgment, stating that the
Hawkins rationale for the privilege against adverse spousal testimony was not at stake:
"The Ryans, who were married for about 40 years, realistically do not contend that
recognition of the marital privilege would have been necessary to protect their mar-
riage." Id, at 543.
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no information was sought relating to intimate marital communica-
tions; and (2) the grant of use immunity to both spouses precluded
any actual adverse use in subsequent criminal proceedings.65
Ryan recalls the analysis of Justice Stewart, concurring in Haw-
kins and forecasting the future of the marital privilege far more ef-
fectively than did the majority in that case.6 6 Insofar as the court's
holding in Ryan is similar to Justice Stewart's concurrence, the logic
of the court is straightforward and consistent with the rulings of the
other circuits. The court's findings in Ryan are precisely those on
which the holdings of post-Trammel courts are based. The confiden-
tial marital relationship is respected. The grant of immunity to both
spouses, rather than merely to one as against the other, effectively
resolves the problem of adverse testimony by eliminating the possi-
bility of testimonial incrimination altogether. On the other hand, the
court's tortured distinguishing of the Hawkins holding and its osten-
sible ground in family harmony epitomizes the difficulty that the de-
cision caused the federal courts in their evolving definition of the
marital privilege, a difficulty that would persist until the Supreme
Court reconsidered and overruled Hawkins in United States v. Tram-
mel in 1980.
III. THE DECONSTRUCTION OF THE MARITAL PRIVILEGE
A. The Federal Rules
The evolution of the federal rules, under whose authority the mari-
tal privilege in turn evolved, does not constitute a changing basis for
the marital privilege. Rather, it is yet another reflection of the
evolution of the marital privilege since Benson. An examination of
the changes in the governing statutory authority-from Rule 26 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, through the Proposed
Draft Rules, up to the enactment of Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence-reveals the impact of the concept of the peculiarly confi-
dential relations of husband and wife, in the light of reason and
experience.
The first modern codification of privilege in the federal courts,
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, drew its formu-
65. Id. The grant of immunity to both spouses in Ryan anticipated the present
and proposed uses of immunity in connection with the compulsion of spousal testi-
mony, rendered thereby no longer adverse. See infra notes 161-67 and accompanying
text.
66. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
lation from two landmark cases dealing with the marital privilege,
Funk and Wolfle :67
The admissibility of evidence and the competency and privileges of wit-
nesses shall be governed, except when an act of Congress or these rules other-
wise provide, by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted
by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience. 68
Rule 26, approved by Congress in 1946 after several years of prepa-
ration by an advisory committee under the supervision of the
Supreme Court, looks both backward and forward. The rule governs
both competency and privileges of witnesses, reflecting the persis-
tence of the ancient doctrine of disqualification that was to haunt the
Supreme Court in Hawkins and the federal courts' subsequent ef-
forts to deal with that decision. The rule also embodies the right and
duty of the courts to question that ancient doctrine "in the light of
reason and experience." It is an invitation, even a mandate, to under-
take deconstructive analysis, as epitomized in Justice Stewart's con-
curring opinion in Hawkins.69
As such, Rule 26, viewed with the evolution of the marital privilege
as both its phenomenological ground and its best exemplar, embodies
the principle of deconstructive analysis as a philosophical underpin-
ning of modern American jurisprudence equal and opposite to stare
decisis, the forceful principle of binding and persuasive precedent.
The power of reason and experience, and the difficult precedent of
Hawkins, collided in the cases subsequent to Hawkins ruling on the
marital privilege. The two principles came into conflict again in the
controversy that ensued upon the next stage in the evolution of the
federal rules governing the marital privilege, the Proposed Draft
Rules of Evidence, in 1969 and 1971.70
Rule 505 of the Proposed Draft Rules specifically provided for a
"Husband-Wife Privilege .... A person has a privilege to prevent
any testimony of his spouse from being admitted in evidence in a
67. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text. For an extensive discussion of
the evolution of the Federal Rules of Evidence, see Haney, supra note 5, at 112-17.
68. The Advisory Committee notes to Rule 26 acknowledge its origin in Funk and
Wolue:
This rule contemplates the development of a uniform body of rules of evi-
dence to be applicable in trials of criminal cases in the Federal courts. It is
based on Funk . . .and Wolfe . . . . The rule does not fetter the applicable
law of evidence to that originally existing at common law. It is contemplated
that the law may be modified and adjusted from time to time by judicial deci-
sion ....
C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 401, at 61 (1969).
69. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 8-9 and ac-
companying text.
70. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for United States District
Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161 (1969), and Revised Draft of Proposed Rules of
Evidence for United States District Courts and Magistrates, 51 F.R.D. 315 (1971) [all
references hereinafter are to the Revised Draft, hereinafter cited as Proposed Draft
Rules].
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criminal proceeding against him."71 The Proposed Draft Rule recog-
nized a "privilege" technically belonging to the spouse against whom
the testimony was to be offered, although in practice the "presumed
authority" of the testifying spouse to claim the privilege on the
other's behalf meant that either spouse could bar adverse spousal tes-
timony. The fact that the right to bar testimony was vested by the
Advisory Committee in accordance with the "usual doctrine . . .of
allowing the injured party to claim or waive privilege" 72 reveals that
the rule in fact continues to be one based on incompetence rather
than privilege. 73 Citing Hawkins, the Advisory Committee claimed
this was "to represent the one aspect of the marital privilege the con-
tinuation of which is warranted." 74
The rule recognized no privilege for confidential marital communi-
cations. The rationale of the Committee for the surprising omission
of the heretofore consistently recognized, widely accepted marital
71. 51 F.R.D. at 369. In full, Proposed Draft Rule 505 provides as follows:
(a) General Rule of Privilege. A person has a privilege to prevent any tes-
timony of his spouse from being admitted in evidence in a criminal proceeding
against him.
(b) Who May Claim the Privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the
person or by the spouse on his behalf. The authority of the spouse to do so is
presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
(c) Exceptions. There is no privilege under this rule (1) in proceedings in
which one spouse is charged with a crime against the person or property of
the other or of a child of either, or with a crime against the person or prop-
erty of a third person committed in the course of committing a crime against
the other, or (2) as to matters occurring prior to the marriage or (3) in pro-
ceedings in which a spouse is charged with importing an alien for prostitution
or other immoral purpose in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1328, or with transporting
a female in interstate commerce for immoral purposes of other offense in vio-
lation of U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424.
Id. Proposed Rule 505(c)(3) preserved the Mann Act exception to the marital privi-
lege. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
72. Id. at 370.
73. See supra note 38.
74. Proposed Draft Rules, 51 F.R.D. at 370. Although the Advisory Committee
cited Hawkins for its continuation of the bar on adverse spousal testimony, the Com-
mittee specifically rejected Hawkins in its comment to Rule 505(c)(3):
(3) The third exception continues and expands established Congressional
policy. In prosecutions for importing aliens for immoral purposes, Congress
has specifically denied the accused any privilege not to have his spouse testify
against him. 18 U.S.C. § 1328. No provision of this nature is included in the
Mann Act, and in Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 79 S. Ct. 136, 3 L. Ed.
2d 125 (1958), the conclusion was reached that the common law privilege con-
tinued. Consistency requires similar results in the two situations. The rule
adopts the Congressional approach, as based upon a more realistic appraisal of
the marriage relationship in cases of this kind, in preference to the specific
result in Hawkins.
Id. at 371.
communication privilege reveals the blindness of the Committee to
the most important ground for a marital privilege, the confidential
relationship of husband and wife:
The traditional justifications for privileges not to testify against a spouse and
not to be testified against by one's spouse have been the prevention of marital
dissension and the repugnancy of requiring a person to condemn or be con-
demned by his spouse. These considerations bear no relevancy to marital
communications. Nor can it be assumed that marital conduct will be affected
by a privilege for confidential communications of whose existence the parties
in all likelihood are unaware.
7 5
As might be expected from the opinions of the cases subsequent to
Hawkins in the two decades prior to the proposal of the rules, there
was an immediate and virtually unanimous outpouring of criticism of
Rule 505 and the Advisory Committee's comments. 76 In this outpour-
ing of support for the preservation of the husband-wife privilege, as
the matter was specifically phrased, the right of privacy emerged as
both the important ground for the privilege, and as the chief benefici-
ary of the preservation of the privilege. The concern, noted by one
commentator in words that are a modern formulation of Benson's pe-
culiarly confidential relations of husband and wife, is not the exclu-
sion of testimony of doubtful veracity (which was the rationale of
incompetence), but the protection of intimate confidential relations:
This matter strikes so close to the heart of privacy that society ought care-
fully to evaluate, in specific cases, the precise countervailing social demands
before that right is sacrificed. The confidential communication . . . is part
and parcel of the right of privacy. . .. [T]estimonial privileges serve as impor-
tant protections of the right of privacy.
7 7
The criticism of the Committee's Proposed Rules recognized the
essential link between the marital privilege and the way in which it
had evolved in the light of reason and experience. Cases subsequent
to Hawkins had found relief from that case's oppressive ruling in the
more permissive language of Rule 26, which the rigid Rule 505 was
intended to replace. The need for careful evaluation in specific cases,
that the commentator quoted above emphasized, led to further resist-
ance to the Proposed Draft Rules. The concern was that rigid codifi-
cation would shut off judicial evolution of testamentary privileges
and the possibility of judicially-fostered growth and change. 78
75. Id. at 370.
76. Haney, supra note 5, at 116 ("The immediate uproar that erupted after the
publication of the Supreme Court's version had a profound effect on Congress. Most
of the criticism was directed at Article V and its attempt to codify the law of
privilege.").
77. Krattenmaker, Testimonial Privileges in Federal Courts: An Alternative to
the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEo. L.J. 61, 85, 94 (1973). See also
Reutlinger, Policy, Privacy and Prerogatives: A Critical Examination of the Proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence as They Affect Marital Privilege, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1353
(1973).
78. Krattenmaker, supra note 77, at 83. Krattenmaker goes on to specifically criti-
cize the Advisory Committee's assertion that the parties to a marriage are unaware of
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In any event, Congress reacted to the criticism of the Proposed
Draft Rules.79 Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence as finally
enacted was more the product of the Proposed Rules' critics than of
the Advisory Committee:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or
provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pur-
suant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government,
State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in
the light of reason and experience .... 80
Both Congress and the courts clearly understood Rule 501 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence to follow on Rule 26 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, which it supplanted. In enacting the rule,
Congress recognized that "husband, wife, or any other of the enu-
merated privileges contained in the Supreme Court rules [the Pro-
posed Draft Rules] ... based on a confidential relationship ...
should be determined on a case by case basis."81 Citing this passage
from the enacting legislation, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in
United States v. Allery held "that this Court, as well as other federal
courts, has the right and the responsibility to examine the policies be-
hind the federal common law privileges and to alter or amend them
when 'reason and experience' so demand."8 2
By reaffirming the grounds of the marital privilege in the princi-
ples of the case law and their further evolution in the light of reason
and experience, Rule 501 represented a significant step in the decon-
struction of the marital privilege. Rule 501 itself reaffirmed the prin-
ciple of deconstructive analysis. The criticisms which led to its final
formulation both explicitly eliminated the old cultural construct of
(and therefore unconcerned with) a right to confidential relations, to "argue that a poll
be taken, and dare the Committee to wager on the outcome." Id. at 91.
79. The Proposed Draft Rules were to become effective in the absence of a con-
gressional veto within 90 days of their transmittal. 56 F.R.D. 184 (1972). Congress,
however, passed legislation requiring affirmative congressional approval for adoption
of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Act of Mar. 30, 1973, PUB. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9.
80. FED. R. EVID. 501 (emphasis added). Compare supra note 68 and accompany-
ing text. Rule 501 continues, "However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect
to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision,
the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof
shall be determined in accordance with State law." Id.
81. Allery, 526 F.2d at 1366 (quoting S. REP. No. 93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1974,
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 7059) (emphasis added).
82. Id. Discussing the evolution of the marital privilege, the court in Allery indi-
cated that the position of Rule 26 "was reiterated by Congress in the enactment of
Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and in the Committee Notes to Rule 501."
Id. at 1364.
incompetence from the language of the rule and grounded the mari-
tal privilege it governed in a nascent cultural construct, the right to
privacy.
B. Trammel v. United States
In Trammel v. United States,8 3 the marital privilege was freed
from the last relic of the doctrine of incompetency, the right of the
spouse against whom adverse spousal testimony was offered to bar
that testimony. The Supreme Court rejected the Hawkins rule, hold-
ing at long last that the witness-spouse alone has the privilege to re-
fuse to testify adversely to spousal interests. In so doing, the Court
found that "the ancient foundations for so sweeping a privilege [the
bar on adverse spousal testimony] . . . have long since disappeared
... . The contemporary justification for affording an accused such a
privilege is unpersuasive."8 4 Accepting the government arguments it
had rejected in Hawkins,8 5 the Court observed that "[w]hen one
spouse is willing to testify against the other in a criminal proceeding
... there is probably little in the way of marital harmony for the
privilege to preserve,"8 6 thus the rule is unlikely to foster family
peace.
The Court rejected the Hawkins rationale in favor of the rationale
in which the confidential marital communications privilege had long
been grounded, the protection of "information privately disclosed be-
tween husband and wife in the confidence of the marital relation-
ship--once described by this Court as 'the best solace of human
existence.' "87 The Court also relied on Rule 501, and Congress' ac-
knowledgement of the federal courts' authority to continue the
evolution of the marital privilege "in the light of reason and experi-
83. 445 U.S. 40. In trial on federal drug charges, defendant Trammel attempted to
bar his wife from testifying as a government witness under a grant of immunity. The
trial court ruled that confidential communications between the defendant and his wife
were privileged, and therefore inadmissible, but that the wife might testify to any act
she observed before or during the marriage, and to any non-confidential communica-
tion. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that Hawkins did not prohibit
voluntary testimony of an immunized, co-conspirator spouse. The Supreme Court af-
firmed. Id. at 43.
84. Id. at 52.
85. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
86. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 52. The Court continued:
Indeed, there is reason to believe that vesting the privilege in the accused
could actually undermine the marital relationship. For example, in a case
such as this, the Government is unlikely to offer a wife immunity and lenient
treatment if it knows that her husband can prevent her from giving adverse
testimony .... It hardly seems conducive to the preservation of the marital
relation to place a wife in jeopardy solely by virtue of her husband's control
over her testimony.
Id. at 52-53.
87. Id. at 51.
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ence,"88 as well as the "trend in state law toward divesting the ac-
cused of the privilege to bar adverse spousal testimony."8 9
Commentators evaluating the Supreme Court's decision in Tram-
mel perceived its impact on the marital privilege in terms of contin-
ued erosion of the privilege, and its devolution into two strictly
limited, much eroded and mutually exclusive privileges.90 When the
Advisory Committee had earlier attempted to eliminate the privilege
for confidential marital communications, the privilege was denigrated
as a relatively weaker companion privilege to professional confiden-
tial privileges of attorneys, physicians and priests.91 But the Court in
Trammel criticized not the confidential marital communications priv-
ilege, but the Hawkins bar on adverse spousal testimony as sweeping
too broadly. The Court explicitly contrasted the Hawkins bar to the
privileges accorded the private communications of priests, attorneys
and physicians in their professional capacities, and implicitly to a re-
88. Id. at 47. The Court stated:
The general mandate of Rule 501 was substituted by the Congress for a set
of privilege rules drafted by the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on
Rules of Evidence and approved by the Judicial Conference of the United
States and by this Court. That proposal defined nine specific privileges, in-
cluding a husband-wife privilege which would have codified the Hawkins rule
and eliminated the privilege for confidential marital communications. See
proposed Fed. Rule Evid. 505. In rejecting the proposed Rules and enacting
Rule 501, Congress manifested an affirmative intention not to freeze the law
of privilege. Its purpose rather was to "provide the courts with the flexibility
to develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis."
Id.
89. Id. at 49-50.
90. See, e.g., United States v. Neal, 743 F.2d 1441, 1444 (10th Cir. 1984) ("as a prac-
tical matter the United States Supreme Court ... may have intended to eliminate the
communication privilege altogether"); Jones, 683 F.2d at 818 (4th Cir. 1982) (Trammel
operates "to narrow, not expand, the scope of the marital testimonial privilege"); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 664 F.2d 423, 429-30 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000
(1982) ("disfavor into which the marital privilege has fallen, largely because of the re-
jection of the archaic notion of the unity of husband and wife"); Haney, supra note 5,
at 146-47, 154-62 (discussing "the historical antipathy that Federal courts have dis-
played against this exclusionary device..." id. at 146; Trammel "may even place the
witness spouse at a greater disadvantage than he or she would have incurred under the
Hawkins rule." Id. at 154); Purdy, supra note 5, at 309 ("In recent years the privilege
has been viewed with greater skepticism"). Comment, The Spousal Testimony Privi-
lege, supra note 20, at 369 (the spousal testimonial privilege "will become a mere cha-
rade"); Note, supra note 5, at 892 ("The development of the rules of evidence has
resulted in waning support for these privileges .... ").
91. Proposed Draft Rules, 51 F.R.D. at 370. Justifying the elimination of any privi-
lege for confidential marital communications, the Advisory Committee noted, "The
other communication privileges, by way of contrast, have as one party a professional
person . . .the relationships from which those privileges arise are essentially and al-
most exclusively verbal in nature, quite unlike marriage." Id.
affirmed confidential marital communications privilege. 92 In Tram-
mel, the confidential marital communications privilege is linked, at
least by juxtaposition and similar "imperative need for confidence
and trust,"93 to the professional privileges, in contrast to the disap-
proved adverse spousal testimony bar.
The views of the commentators were well-reasoned in terms of
traditional rhetorical analysis, looking to the logically and temporally
prior rhetorical grounds of the marital privilege now disapproved in
Trammel. One commentator goes so far as to assert that, with the
repudiation of the Hawkins reasoning, the Trammel opinion is "a de
novo analysis by the Supreme Court and the Court's rationale must
be considered independently of Hawkins."94 While it may be true
that the Court's rationale in Trammel is independent of the Hawkins
majority opinion, it is scarcely de novo analysis. It is in fact an adop-
tion by the Court's majority of the deconstructive analysis contained
in Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Hawkins.95 Moreover, as
noted earlier in this comment, the process of deconstruction is not
the process of destruction.96 The displacement of the rhetorical
grounds of the marital privilege does not invalidate the marital privi-
92. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51. The Court stated:
No other testimonial privilege sweeps so broadly. The privileges between
priest and penitent, attorney and client, and physician and patient limit pro-
tection to private communications. These privileges are rooted in the impera-
tive need for confidence and trust .... The Hawkins rule stands in marked
contrast to these three privileges. Its protection is not limited to confidential
communications; rather it permits an accused to exclude all adverse spousal
testimony.
Id.
93. Id. The Court emphasized, "It is essential to remember that the Hawkins priv-
ilege is not needed to protect information privately disclosed between husband and
wife in the confidence of marital relationship-once described by this Court as 'the
best solace of human existence.'" Id.
94. Comment, The Spousal Testimony Privilege, supra note 20, at 366.
95. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text. As he had in Hawkins, Justice
Stewart contributed a separate concurring opinion in Trammel, comparing the "all but
unanimous opinion" of Hawkins to the "all but unanimous opinion" of Trammel. Each
opinion, of course, was unanimous but for the concurring opinion of Justice Stewart,
who did not let the opportunity pass for continuing his deconstructive analysis:
The fact of the matter is that the Court in this case simply accepts the very
same arguments that the Court rejected when the Government first made
them in the Hawkins case in 1958. I thought those arguments were valid
then, and I think so now.
The Court is correct when it says that "[t]he ancient foundations for so
sweeping a privilege have long since disappeared." Ante, at 52. But those
foundations had disappeared well before 1958; their disappearance certainly
did not occur in the few years that have elapsed between the Hawkins deci-
sion and this one. To paraphrase what Mr. Justice Jackson once said in an-
other context, there is reason to believe that today's opinion of the Court will
be of greater interest to students of human psychology than to students of
law.
Trammel, 445 U.S. at 54 (Stewart, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
96. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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lege. The opinion in Trammel, referring as it does to the "need to
protect the confidence of the marital relationship,"97 is rooted firmly
in the phenomenally prior grounding of the marital privilege, charac-
terized since Benson as the substantive confidential relation of hus-
band and wife. The Court's disapproval of the old cultural construct
did not destroy the marital privilege, but in fact freed it from a bur-
den of argument and rationalization that had for too long rendered it
problematic.
IV. THE MARITAL PRIVILEGE SINCE TRAMMEL
A. The Question of Voluntariness
With the Supreme Court's decision in Trammel, the admission of
voluntary adverse spousal testimony became the formal rule rational-
izing the emergent practice of the courts that the Court in fact had
acknowledged in that decision.98 The most immediate consequence
of Trammel was the shift of judicial focus to the concern articulated
in Justice Stewart's prescient concurring opinion in Hawkins.99 The
Justice had concurred in the majority's refusal to create a testimonial
privilege vested in the witness spouse only, eliminating the accused's
right to bar adverse testimony, because Hawkins was "hardly the
case in which to advance it."100 The proposed privilege would have
applied only to prevent the compulsion of adverse spousal testimony:
These circumstances [of Hawkins] are hardly consistent with the theory that
her testimony was voluntary. Moreover, they serve to emphasize that the rule
advanced by the Government would not, as it argues, create "a standard which
has the great advantage of simplicity." On the contrary, such a rule would be
difficult to administer and easy to abuse. Seldom would it be a simple matter
to determine whether the spouse's testimony were really voluntary, since
there would often be ways to compel such testimony more subtle than the
simple issuance of a subpoena, but just as cogent.1 0 1
In the event, the question of voluntariness has been resolved with
little difficulty or conflict by the courts. The Supreme Court in
Trammel, establishing the privilege rejected in Hawkins, disposed of
97. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51.
98. See supra notes 47-66 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
100. Hawkins, 358 U.S. at 82. Justice Stewart stated:
Under such a rule the defendant in a criminal case could not prevent his wife
from testifying against him, but she could not be compelled to do so .... A
supplemental record shows that before [defendant's wife] testified, she had
been imprisoned as a material witness and released under $3,000 bond condi-
tioned upon her appearance in court as a witness for the United States.
Id at 82-83.
101. Id. at 83.
voluntariness concerns with one sentence: "When one spouse is will-
ing to testify against the other in a criminal prosecution-whatever
the motivation-their relationship is almost certainly in disrepair.
" . .-102 The analysis of voluntariness that follows from this state-
ment is clear. Whether adverse spousal testimony is voluntary is a
relevant subject of inquiry only where the confidential relations of
husband and wife substantively exist; where the substantive marital
relationship exists, it is protected by the marital privilege. The fed-
eral courts had in practice abrogated the Hawkins bar on adverse
spousal testimony while continuing to protect marital confidentiality
in the years prior to Trammel by just such reasoning. Under these
rulings, voluntary adverse spousal testimony was admitted where no
otherwise confidential communications were involved because the
marriage, however valid, did not exist as a "social fact." 0 3
This allowance of voluntary adverse spousal testimony in the ab-
sence of a substantive marital relationship is the practice in the fed-
eral courts today. The analyses of the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals 104 in United States v. Neal 10 5 and United States v.
Kapnison,10 6 both decided in September, 1984, are representative. In
Neal, the defendant appealed from a conviction for murder in the
course of a bank robbery, challenging the admissibility of his wife's
testimony as an immunized government witness. Citing Trammel,
the court found that Neal's wife had voluntarily elected to testify af-
ter being granted immunity from prosecution as an accessory after
the fact to her husband's offense.1 0 7 Marcia Neal had filed for di-
vorce and was living with another man at the time of the trial. The
court summarized a sequence of events that made it clear that the
grant of immunity and decision to testify had followed rather than
provoked the breakdown of the marital relationship. 108 The circum-
102. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 52 (emphasis added). The Court suggested further that
the rejected bar on adverse spousal testimony might work an equal if opposite injustice
by denying a spouse the opportunity to bargain for lenient treatment or immunity. See
supra note 86.
103. United States v. Cameron, 556 F.2d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 1977). See supra notes 56-
59 and accompanying text.
104. It was a Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, United States v. Trammel,
583 F.2d 1166 (10th Cir. 1978), that the Supreme Court affirmed, thereby establishing
the present marital privilege in Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
105. 743 F.2d 1441 (10th Cir. 1984).
106. 743 F.2d 1450 (10th Cir. 1984).
107. Nea4 743 F.2d at 1444-45.
108. The court noted that "Marcia [Mrs. Neal] testified on cross-examination that
she lived with Neal for eight months after the robbery without revealing anything
about the robbery or the money to anyone." Id. at 1443. Quoting from Mrs. Neal's
trial testimony:
Q. And, Mrs. Neal, what was the relationship between yourself and Mr.
Dietz at that time?
A. Well, it started out as a working companion. He worked with me. He
shared a shift with me, and we became very close, and I confided in him quite
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stances of Neal replicate the factual pattern of Trammel insofar as
the witness-spouse in that case also testified under a grant of immu-
nity.10 9 More clearly than in Trammel, the court's recitation of the
facts in Neal emphasizes that, whatever the legal status of the Neal's
marriage, their marital relationship was substantively nonexistent.
Pursuant to this analysis, the court held that testimony of the immu-
nized witness-spouse was voluntary adverse testimony, admissible
under Trammel. ii0
The question of voluntariness does not arise exclusively in the con-
text of a grant of immunity to a witness-spouse. In United States v.
Kapnison, the defendant, convicted in a loan kick-back scheme, con-
tended that government agents contacted his wife while he was the
target of a grand jury investigation and "coerced her into becoming
an agent for the government."'' The appellate court affirmed the
district court's finding that the defendant's wife had testified volunta-
rily.112 The court based its affirmation directly on "significant" trial
a bit, to the point that I told him about my problem, and hoping for some help
to get out of my situation.
Q. And when you say you told him about your problem, what did you tell
him your problem was?
A. I told him that my husband had robbed this Midland Savings and that
he had killed this girl and that I was trying to get away.
Id. at 1443-44 (emphasis added). Finally, the trial court summarized the sequence of
events:
During repeated and vigorous cross-examination, Marcia acknowledged
that: she was aware of the robbery on the evening it occurred but decided not
to go to the police; she was repeatedly interviewed by the police but did not
mention anything about receiving the money from her husband; she spent the
money so it wouldn't be around because she couldn't bear to have it in her
house; she cooperated with the police to avoid the possibility of going to jail;
she was afforded immunity to testify; and by testifying she was doing what
she had planned all along, that is, to get rid of NeaL
Id. at 1444 (emphasis added).
109. See supra note 83.
110. Neal, 743 F.2d at 1444-45.
111. Kapnison, 743 F.2d at 1453. The court noted Kapnison's argument that "the
conduct of the government's agents was particularly egregious when, as here, the
agents took advantage of the fact that he was involved in divorce proceedings and at-
tempting to reconcile with his wife." Id.
112. The relevant portion of the opinion, in full, is as follows: "There was no show-
ing whatsoever that Natalyn Kapnison was coerced into cooperating with the United
States. Mrs. Kapnison testified she cooperated with the government voluntarily. No
evidence was presented to the contrary. (R., Vol. I at 289). We agree with the district
court's finding that Natalyn testified voluntarily." Id.
In United States v. Crouthers, 669 F.2d 635 (10th Cir. 1982), the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals approved a procedural standard for the determination that adverse
spousal testimony is voluntary. Holding that a witness-spouse had properly waived her
right to refuse to testify adversely to her defendant husband, the court cited the fol-
lowing factors: the trial court held a hearing and informed her prior to testimony and
testimony of the witness-spouse, which the court quoted in full in the
opinion:
We find the following testimony significant: Q. (Mr. Marchiondo, Attorney
for Kapnison). Your husband did not want a divorce, and wanted to remain
married to you at that time, is that correct? A. (Natalyn Kapnison). No, sir,
that is not correct .... [You remember the three-way conversation, this
was before the grand jury, and I don't want to be offensive here in this court-
room, but Nick was on one phone, I was on another, and you were on another.
And he says, "I've been trying to get rid of this so-and-so for 20 years, and
now she wants a divorce when it's inconvenient."
And I pleaded with you to help me, that I was afraid .... So he was not
trying to reconcile at that time, no, sir.
Q. And even from that time on through January, through February and even
before the divorce, he tried to persuade you not to get a divorce, isn't that so?
A. No, sir. At that time, he did not. I don't remember the exact dates, but
when the grand jury subpoenaed me is when he started being nice.1 13
Based on this testimony and citing Trammel, the court rejected the
defendant's contention that his wife's testimony before the grand
jury and at trial violated the adverse spousal testimony privilege. 14
In Kapnison, as in Neal, the court found the motivation for this
testimony in the disrepair, even the demise of the marital relation-
ship-not in any coercion or more subtle persuasion on the part of
the government. In such analyses, the deconstruction of the marital
privilege is complete. What had been implicit in the practice of the
federal courts long before Trammel has become explicit in the years
since. The substantial marital relationship itself has emerged as both
logical and phenomenal cause and ground of the privilege's increas-
ingly clear definition.115
B. The Exclusion of Criminal Communications
With the admission of voluntary spousal testimony established as
the rule by the Supreme Court in Trammel, the issue of compulsion
of spousal testimony became the chief concern of the federal courts
in defining the scope of the marital privilege. An exception to the
out of the presence of the jury of her privilege not to testify against the defendant; the
witness-spouse in response indicated her desire to testify, and on cross-examination ac-
knowledged that she had the right not to testify but that she chose to do so; the trial
court then ruled that the witness-spouse would be allowed to testify about her observa-
tions, and about conversations with her husband in the presence of third parties, but
that she would not be allowed to testify to private conversations. The Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals approved the trial court's actions, stating, "[t]his rule is in accordance
with Trammel." Id. at 641-42.
But see Neal, 743 F.2d at 1444. Reviewing a district court's ruling in similar circum-
stances, the same court stated: "We regard the district court's ruling in this respect
[that the witness-spouse could not testify to a confidential communication in which the
defendant, her spouse, had told her about the crime] to have been taken out of an
abundance of caution." Id& In some circumstances a witness-spouse may testify to con-
fidential communications. See infra notes 116-36 and accompanying text.
113. Kapnison, 743 F.2d at 1453-54.
114. Id. at 1454.
115. Compare supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
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Hawkins rule barring spousal testimony had been developed by the
federal courts in the years prior to Trammel, admitting voluntary ad-
verse testimony where the spouses were joint participants in
crime. 1 6 Immediately after the Trammel decision was handed down,
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Appeal of MalfitanoIl7 was
asked to establish a rule that spousal testimony could be compelled
where the witness-spouse is alleged to be involved in the criminal
acts of the nonwitness-spouse.llS The court rejected this proposed
exception, reasoning that the mere allegation that married parties
are involved jointly in criminal acts does not lead to the conclusion
that a marital relationship does not exist. Distinguishing compelled
spousal testimony from voluntary testimony, the court cited
Trammel:
The Supreme Court explicitly relied on the fact that if the witness spouse is
willing to testify, then the marriage probably is beyond salvage. The Court
seems to have assumed that this provides adequate safeguards insofar as the
marriage has fallen apart due to the criminal activity of at least one of the
116. See supra notes 36, 60 and accompanying text.
117. 633 F.2d 276 (3rd Cir. 1980). The appellant in Malfitano appealed a contempt
order for refusing to answer questions before a grand jury investigating an alleged
criminal conspiracy involving her husband, other individuals and several corporate en-
tities. The court determined that the appellant had:
invoked the privilege, which is the proper course under Trammel. Moreover,
all of the questions would seem to implicate her husband. He is the president
of all of the corporations involved, and the questions about the June 15 meet-
ing would implicate him either if he attended it or because it was held at one
of the corporate offices .... Thus unless there is something that indicates
that the rationale for the privilege does not apply here, reversal of the con-
tempt citation is required.
Id. at 277.
118. "The major justification offered by the government for not according appellant
the privilege is the fact that she was allegedly involved in the criminal acts of her hus-
band." Id. at 278. The government filed an affidavit stating that they had "received
information from a cooperating witness in this matter indicating that Ruth Malfitano
is a co-conspirator by reason of her knowledge of the object of the conspiracy and her
facilitation of the attainment of the object of the conspiracy." Id. at 278 n.3 (emphasis
added). A comment of the court indicates the flimsy basis of the exception proposed
by the government, especially in the context of potential conspiracy charges: "Given
the intimacy of marriage and the fact that conspiracy is a rather flexible concept, it
will be quite easy to allege that the spouses are partners. Ironically, the closer the
marriage, the more likely it will appear that both spouses are involved." Id. at 279.
The good judgment of the court may be illustrated by a comparison to the factual
circumstances of Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332 (1951), in which the Supreme
Court held that a husband was privileged to refuse to disclose the whereabouts of his
wife to a grand jury which had subpoenaed her. See supra note 32 and accompanying
text. Certainly in Blau, both spouses were involved in concealing the wife's location;
however, to consider the husband a co-partner in crime by virtue of his knowledge
would be absurd. Cf. infra note 159.
spouses, and the same would seem to be true where both may be involved. 11 9
The refusal of the court in Malfitano to recognize the proposed ex-
ception to the protection of the marital privilege has led to a percep-
tion that the scope of the marital privilege is unsettled in
circumstances where criminal involvement of the witness-spouse is
alleged.120 However, an examination of the cases ruling on the mari-
tal privilege where spouses were joint participants in crime reveals
that the scope of the privilege in this regard, both prior and subse-
quent to Mafitano, is consistent and well defined. It is the content of
particular testimony that has been refused the protection of the mar-
ital privilege, not the act of testifying against one's spouse. Neither
before nor after Trammel removed the bar on adverse spousal testi-
mony has the mere existence of joint crimes by itself abrogated the
protection of the marital privilege. Where the contents of the testi-
mony sought are otherwise available, however, the courts have con-
sistently held that spousal communications pertaining to ongoing or
future criminal activity are not protected. 1 2 1
Misunderstanding of the court's decision in Malfitano is rooted in
119. Malfitano, 633 F.2d at 278.
120. See Purdy, supra note 5, at 319-22 ("the applicability of the law of marital priv-
ilege is not well settled when spouses engage in criminal activity").
121. E.g., United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
344 (1983) (wife permitted to testify about confidential marital communications "be-
cause they pertained to ongoing or future criminal activity involving both spouses
.... We reject Ghassan's contention that our decision in Appeal of Malfitano ...
holds to the contrary." Id. at 257 (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). See also
Kapnison, 743 F.2d at 1450 (when a husband and wife form a partnership in crime, ex-
trajudicial statements made in furtherance of the criminal activity may, by consent of
the witness-spouse, be used against the other); Neal, 743 F.2d at 1444 (conversations
between husband and wife about crimes in which they participate are not privileged
marital communications); United States v. Archer, 733 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1984) (out of
court statement of wife to FBI agent is "not brought within ... privilege merely be-
cause she was conveniently available to take the stand ... and request its exclusion."
Id. at 359. Confidential communications between husband and wife in furtherance of
embezzlement in which both participated are admissible via that statement. Id. at
360); United States v. Broome, 732 F.2d 363 (4th Cir. 1984) (third party testimony about
confidential statements of wife to husband revealed to him by husband admissible,
where district court found that there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could
conclude "that [the husband and wife] were members of the conspiracy" to transport
and sell stolen vehicles, id. at 364-65); United States v. Entrekin, 624 F.2d 597, 598 (5th
Cir. 1980) (former wife permitted to testify about confidential marital communications
in furtherance of mail fraud conspiracy in which both were active participants); United
States v. Price, 577 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1068 (1979) (extraju-
dicial statements of husband and wife admissible against each other, when made in
furtherance of criminal conspiracy); United States v. Mendoza, 574 F.2d 1373, 1381 (5th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 988 (1978) (taped conversations between husband and
wife about crimes in which they were jointly participating when the conversations oc-
curred not within the privilege's protection of confidential marital communications);
United States v. Kahn, 471 F.2d 191, 194 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986
(1973), rev'd on other grounds, 413 U.S. 143 (1974) (intercepted conversations between
husband and wife had to do with the commission of a crime and not the privacy of the
marriage, and are admissible).
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the history of the marital privilege. The federal courts first created
the exception to the marital privilege where spouses were joint par-
ticipants in crime as one of the ways to circumvent the Hawkins rule
barring spousal testimony.12 2 The factual circumstances in all of
these cases indicated the absence of a substantive marital relation-
ship, the most persistent ground for the marital privilege throughout
its evolution. In most of these cases, a basis for the admission of vol-
untary testimony was explicitly found in the absence of the substan-
tive marital relationship.123 Reflecting the fragmentation of the
privilege at that time, however, a joint participants' exception was
also invoked as an independent basis for the admission of adverse
spousal testimony.124 With the Supreme Court's disapproval of the
bar on adverse spousal testimony in Trammel, voluntary spousal tes-
timony is admissible within the rule, without need to resort to excep-
tional justification. Post-Trammel, the ground for the admission of
adverse spousal testimony is the absence of the substantive marital
relationship. This is recognized in the voluntariness of the testimony
and, most importantly, established in the contents of that testi-
mony,12 5 just as it had been in the practice of the courts prior to
122. See generally supra notes 33-66 and accompanying text.
123. Id. See also supra notes 26, 31, 36, 47-49, 60.
124. Id.
125. See supra notes 102-15 and accompanying text. In the exemplary cases of Neal
and Kapnison, discussed supra in notes 105-12 and accompanying text, the court also
found in the voluntary testimony of the witness-spouse the necessary basis for admit-
ting criminal communications between the spouses. In an opinion concurring in both
cases, Judge Logan expressed reservations about admitting otherwise confidential com-
munications by voluntary testimony of a witness-spouse. The reservations are reminis-
cent of those concerns expressed by Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion in
Hawkins (see supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text):
Finally, I see problems in creating a crime-fraud exception or even in making
the privilege available only at the option of the testifying spouse or ex-spouse.
Prosecutors will be tempted to threaten the spouse they deem less culpable
and offer reduced charges or immunity for testimony that will convict but de-
stroy the marriage. Additionally, the reliability of the spousal testimony
might be questionable. Confidential communications, by definition, are con-
versations with only the spouses present. The spouse charged with the crime
must surrender the constitutional right not to testify at his or her criminal
trial, with all its attendant consequences, in order to refute the other's testi-
mony. And, particularly if the marriage has ended in divorce, the testifying
ex-spouse may be tempted to lie or to stretch the truth.
Neal, 743 F.2d at 1448 (Logan, J., concurring). Judge Logan, however, concurred in the
admission of Marcia Neal's testimony by finding that the subject of her testimony had
both testimonial and nontestimonial aspects, and that the majority of her testimony
did not violate a confidential communications privilege. Moreover, he noted that
otherwise inadmissible testimony involving marital communications is admissible to
impeach a defendant who testifies on his own behalf. Id (citing United States v. Ben-
ford, 457 F. Supp. 589 (E.D. Mich. 1978)).
Trammel.
The court's ruling in Malfitano was based on just such an analysis.
Although the court recognized that a joint participants' exception
was "supported by dictum or holding in a number of cases," the court
framed its inquiry following Trammel: "The question therefore in
considering the proposed exception is whether such circumstances
mean that the rationale of the privilege is not served in the present
case."126 The question, after Trammel, was no longer the admissibil-
ity of available voluntary testimony. Absent the voluntary testimony
on which the court could make a determination that the marital priv-
ilege was not available, the court refused to compel the testimony of
the witness-spouse.
Like the Supreme Court's ruling in Trammel, the court's ruling in
Malfitano was deconstructive.127 Basing its decision on the phenome-
nal ground of the substantive marital relationship, the court did not
unsettle the marital privilege, but in fact clarified its scope. A joint
participant's exception to the marital privilege has been subsumed
into the rule after Trammel, with consequently clearer guidelines for
the scope of the marital privilege.
However, although a spouse may not be compelled to testify, the
scope of the marital privilege clearly does not extend to protect com-
munications between spouses pertaining to criminal activity. Testi-
mony as to interspousal communications about crimes is admissible,
either in voluntary testimony or where otherwise available.128 The
exclusion of criminal communications from the protection of the
marital privilege was developed in a second line of federal court rul-
ings on the marital privilege prior to Trammel. Independent of the
availability of spousal testimony, the courts ruled that marital com-
munications about crimes in which both spouses were participants
were admissible as "not marital communications for the purpose of
the marital privilege, and thus ... not ... within the privilege's pro-
126. Malfitano, 633 F.2d at 278. The Supreme Court in Trammel recognized exep-
tions to the Hawkins rule in a footnote that did not mention any exception for joint
participants in crime, but linked the exceptions mentioned to both adverse testimony
and confidential communications:
The decision in Wyatt recognized an exception to Hawkins for cases in
which one spouse commits a crime against the other. 362 U.S. at 526. This
exception, placed on the ground of necessity, was a long standing one at com-
mon law. See Lord Audley's Case, 123 Eng. Rep. 1140 (1631); 8 Wigmore
§ 2239. It has been expanded since then to include crimes against the spouse's
property, see Herman v. United States, 220 F.2d 219, 226 (4th Cir. 1955), and in
recent years crimes against children of either spouse, United States v. Allery,
526 F.2d 1362 (8th Cir. 1975). Similar exceptions have been found to the confi-
dential marital communications privilege. See 8 Wigmore § 2338.
Trammel, 445 U.S. at 46 n.7.
127. See supra notes 8, 43-45, 95 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 121.
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tection of confidential marital communications."129 From its incep-
tion, the exclusion of criminal communications was grounded in the
present rationale of the privilege. Such communications are con-
cerned with the commission of a crime, not with the privacy of a
marriage;130 the information sought has nothing to do with intimate
marital relations and the privacy interests of husband and wife are
not at stake.131
Unlike the independent joint participants exception, the exclusion
of criminal communications is consistent with the protection of the
marital relationship. After Trammel, that relationship becomes the
ground of an increasingly coherent privilege. If the spousal testi-
mony sought is otherwise available, the protection of the privilege is
coextensive with the boundaries of the confidential relations of hus-
band and wife. If the testimony is prospective, then the contents are
presumptively protected by the privilege. Only if it can be shown
that the prospective contents fall outside the confidential relations of
husband and wife-in this regard, as criminal communications be-
tween spouses, both participants-will the testimony by compelled.
As the Supreme Court did in Trammel, courts have analogized the
protection of marital communications to the protection afforded by
the other confidential communications privileges.132 However, the
marital privilege differs significantly from these other testimonial
privileges even in this area where the protection of confidential com-
munications, or lack thereof, suggests commonality. The crime-fraud
exception to the attorney-client privilege sanctions and even man-
dates an invasion of an otherwise protected confidential relation-
ship.133 In the exclusion of criminal communications from the
129. Mendoza, 574 F.2d at 1381. See supra note 36.
130. Mendoza, 574 F.2d at 1380; Kahn, 471 F.2d at 194.
131. Ryan, 568 F.2d at 543. See also supra notes 36, 64.
132. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. See also
Ammar, 714 F.2d at 258 (the "privilege is akin to the attorney-client privilege, also
designed to protect the confidences of the communicator, which has been held not to
extend to communications in furtherance of criminal activity"); Maltano, 633 F.2d at
279 n.5 (attorney-client privilege comparison to confidential communication privilege
appropriate, but not to adverse testimony privilege); Mendoza, 574 F.2d at 1381 n.6
(since the law does not recognize the attorney-client privilege during or before the
commission of a crime, marital privilege will not be allowed in the same situation);
United States v. Nelson, 485 F. Supp. 941, 974 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (comparing the physi-
cian-patient privilege to the marital privilege); Benford, 457 F. Supp. at 598 (comparing
the marital privilege to Draft of Proposed Rule 511, privilege to prevent testimony
about confidential matter or communication). See generally Purdy, supra note 5, at
317-22 (comparing the attorney-client privilege to the marital privilege).
133. See Purdy, supra note 5, at 317-19.
protection of the marital privilege, there is no invasion of the pro-
tected marital relationship. Testimony is not compelled. Instead, the
communication is available outside the confidentiality of the relation-
ship, by what amounts to a qualified waiver of confidentiality: by the
witness-spouse in the voluntariness of the testimony;1 3 4 or by a vol-
untary spousal statement otherwise admissible.13 5 As noted above,
the waiver is a qualified one. Only if the testimony or otherwise
available spousal statement falls outside the confidential relations of
husband and wife, in this instance as criminal communications be-
tween spouses, will it be deemed admissible.136
C. The Definition of Adverse Testimony
Appeal of Malfitano37 was also important in defining the scope of
the marital privilege as the first in a line of cases concerned with the
definition of adverse testimony. The court in Malfitano refused to
compel a witness-spouse to testify before a grand jury pursuing an in-
vestigation in which her husband was a target. In so doing, the court
rejected the premise of the district court's order of contempt, "that
because the government has promised not to use appellant's testi-
mony in future proceedings against her husband, the appellant has
no reason to invoke the privilege." 3 8 The court held that the testi-
mony was adverse, and therefore the privilege existed, because the
134. Kapnison, 743 F.2d at 1453-54; Neal, 743 F.2d at 1444-45; Ammar, 714 F.2d at
257-58; Entrekin, 624 F.2d at 598. See supra notes 121, 125.
135. Archer, 733 F.2d at 360; Broome, 732 F.2d at 364-65; Price, 577 F.2d at 1365;
Mendoza, 574 F.2d at 1380; Kahn, 471 F.2d at 194. See supra note 121.
The waiver appears to be a crucial factor. In United States v. Geller, 560 F. Supp.
1309 (E.D. Pa. 1983), the court admitted the voluntarily spoken, intercepted, taped
communications of each spouse concerning the crime with which they were charged as
codefendants. Citing United States v. King, 536 F. Supp. 253, 267 n.22 (C.D. Cal. 1982),
the court noted that, while there was "no error in introducing taped spousal communi-
cations where one spouse consents thereto," recordings of conversations directly be-
tween the spouses were not admissible. Geller, 560 F. Supp. at 1326. The court's
ruling in Geller is weakened as precedent by supporting the ruling entirely on state
cases and a dubious extension of Malfitano to cover these already available "conspira-
torial utterings between spouses." Id. at 1327. Contrary to the federal courts, state
courts modernly appear to extend the marital privilege to prevent testimony as to
communications eavesdropped by the connivance or betrayal of the spouse to whom
the communication was addressed. See Annot., 3 A.L.R.4th 1104 (1981).
136. As has historically been the pattern, the most recent cases find multiple bases
for finding that testimony or otherwise available spousal statements fall outside the
confidential relations of husband and wife. See, e.g., Neal, 743 F.2d at 1446 (basis for
admission in impeachment). See also Kapnison, 743 F.2d at 1453 (statements revealed
to third parties by defendant who made them). The common basis, although not ex-
plicitly linked with the criminal communications exclusion, appears to be the absence,
at the time the communications were made, of a substantive and viable marital rela-
tionship, as evidenced in the voluntary testimony of the witness-spouse. Compare
supra notes 108, 113 and accompanying text.
137. 633 F.2d 276 (3rd Cir. 1980). See supra note 117.
138. Malfitano, 633 F.2d at 279.
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grand jury may indict the witness' husband on the basis of her testi-
mony.139 Citing In re Snoonian, a First Circuit case decided in 1974,
the court stated that if the witness' spouse were not a target, and the
government expressly promised that there was no intention to prose-
cute the spouse on the basis of the witness' testimony, then there
would be no privilege against compelled testimony.140
Courts ruling on the compulsion of spousal testimony in subse-
quent cases have further refined the definition of adverse testimony.
Not all testimony that is situationally adverse to the witness' spouse
falls within the protection of the marital privilege. The privilege is
not absolute, and a witness-spouse may be compelled to answer cer-
tain questions, even in a grand jury investigation where the spouse is
a target.'4 1 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in In re Grand
Jury Proceedings that the witness-spouse could be required to an-
swer "'objective' questions containing no reference to her husband
... neither calculated to, nor capable of incriminating her hus-
band."142 However, the court upheld the privilege with respect to two
other questions, because the answers "might reflect negatively on her
husband's innocence."'143 The basis for the determination was the
139. Id. at 279-80.
140. Id. at 280 (citing In re Snoonian, 502 F.2d 110 (1st Cir. 1974)). In Snoonian,
the government filed an affidavit stating: "On behalf of the United States Government,
I hereby represent and agree that no testimony of Gary Snoonian before the Grand
Jury, or its fruits, will be used in any way in any proceeding against his wife."
Snoonian, 502 F.2d at 112. See infra note 149.
141. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 664 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 1000 (1982). The court affirmed the civil contempt conviction of a witness-spouse
who refused to answer specific questions before a grand jury investigating an alleged
unlawful campaign by the Church of Scientology to harass, discredit, and silence orga-
nizations critical of the church. Both husband and wife were members of the Church
of Scientology. The government alleged specifically that the husband, an attorney, ac-
ted as an undercover operative for the church and breached attorney-client relation-
ships by disclosing confidential communications to the church and its attorneys. Id. at
424.
142. Id. at 430.
Questions as to whether she resided in Pinellas County; whether she is a
member of the Church of Scientology; whether she was ever employed by the
Church; and whether she knows Cazares or worked in his election campaign,
appear entirely innocuous, neither calculated to, nor capable of incriminating
her husband.
Id.
143. Id.
The court concedes that answers to the last two questions regarding whether
Mrs. Vannier worked in the Cazares campaign at the instruction of the
Church of Scientology and whether she was sent to Pinellas County as an un-
dercover operator to work on Cazares' campaign committee might reflect neg-
atively on her husband's innocence. For that reason, we hereby strike Mrs.
same as that in Malfitano; where the testimony is not adverse, it does
not fall within the protection of the marital privilege.
Substantive adverse impact appears to be the standard for deter-
mining whether testimony is adverse. Although the question has not
been ruled on directly, dicta in at least one case in the Seventh Cir-
cuit, United States v. C7ark,144 indicates that compulsion of facially
exculpatory testimony, if used by the government to obtain a convic-
tion, would not be approved.145
The cases above constitute relatively well-settled precedent that
spousal testimony directly adverse to the nonwitness-spouse is pro-
tected by the marital privilege. The extent to which the privilege
may be upheld to protect indirectly adverse spousal testimony is less
settled. In a case subsequent to Malfitano, In re Grand Jury Mat-
ter,146 the same court extended the protection of the marital privilege
to a witness-spouse's testimony concerning a third party, when that
testimony would indirectly incriminate her husband.147 The court's
Vannier's contempt conviction as to those latter questions only, on the
grounds of spousal privilege. In doing so, the court rejects a sweeping applica-
tion of the privilege to the five preceding questions. In United States v.
Brown, 605 F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1979), the court reached the same conclusion
when it refused to apply the marital privilege to objective questioning ....
Id. (footnote omitted). The court's decision in In re Grand Jury Proceedings, however,
differs from Brown in that the witness-spouse's testimony in Brown was defined as
"objective" because her marriage to the defendant was virtually nonexistent. See
supra note 53 and accompanying text. In In re Grand Jury Proceedings, the determi-
nation that the questions were "objective" was reached in the context of an ongoing
and unquestioned marital relationship.
144. 712 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1983).
145. Id. at 303. In Clark, the court affirmed on other grounds the criminal con-
tempt conviction of a husband who refused to testify at the trial of his wife for a bank
theft in which both participated, prior to their marriage. He had testified at his own
trial that his wife was not involved, and was subpoenaed to his wife's retrial because
the government believed the incredibility of his testimony would bolster the govern-
ment's case. Id. at 300. The Clark opinion virtually stands alone among the cases since
Trammel in its singularly restrictive definition of the marital privilege (no privilege
for joint participants in crime; no privilege for acts prior to marriage). Therefore, the
reservations the court expresses about facially exculpatory testimony as ostensibly
nonadverse are the more persuasive.
146. 673 F.2d 688 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1015 (1982). In In re Grand Jury
Matter, the United States appealed from an order denying the government's motion to
compel the testimony of an immunized witness-spouse before a grand jury investigat-
ing a conspiracy to distribute illegal drugs in which both she and her husband were
allegedly involved. The witness-spouse had previously been convicted for her partici-
pation in the illegal drug operation; her spouse along with several other named co-con-
spirators were targets of the grand jury investigation. The court affirmed the denial of
the government's action to compel. Id.
147. Id. at 692. The court stated, in pertinent part:
We hold that when, as in the present case, the Government openly seeks
one spouse's testimony concerning the activity of a third party, who is alleged
to have engaged in a common criminal scheme with a husband and his wife,
and the Government thereby hopes also to reach the nonwitness spouse, the
testimony sought is sufficiently adverse to the interests of the absent spouse
to permit invocation of the privilege against adverse spousal testimony.
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decision was much criticized as an expansion of the marital testimo-
nial privilege to protect testimony with any tendency, no matter how
speculative, to be adverse to the nonwitness-spouse. i48
However, analyzed in the context of Malfitano and Snoonian, the
two cases upon which the court relied, the court's analysis in Grand
Jury Matter in fact clarifies the definition of adverse testimony. In
Snoonian, the court held that "the speculative nature of the threat
[to the nontestifying spouse], coupled with the government's unequiv-
ocal and convincing promises not to use any of the testimony against
her," provided no grounds in the marital privilege for the witness' re-
fusal to testify.' 49 In Malfitano, the court upheld the marital privi-
Id.
148. Id. at 696 (Adams, J., dissenting). See also Purdy, supra note 5, at 314-17, 322-
27; Note, supra note 20, at 134-37 ("The decision fails to define the degree of adversity
necessary to qualify the testimony as 'sufficiently adverse' to the nonwitness-spouse's
interest .... [T]he Third Circuit's holding was an inadvertent expansion of the privi-
lege to the outer limits of the marital interest." Id. at 134).
Purdy's article is of particular interest because he represented the United States in
In re Grand Jury Matter. He states that the court's "expansive view of a witness 'indi-
rectly implicating' the nonwitness-spouse improperly expands the scope of the marital
privilege to protect third-party co-conspirators who are the targets of reasonable gov-
ernment investigations involving criminal activity of the witness." Purdy, supra note
5, at 326. In Purdy's view, the witness-spouse's testimony ought not to be defined as
adverse where any of the following reasons are present:
the assertion of the privilege is overbroad as each question can be answered
without implicating the witness' spouse directly; the government has taken
steps to ensure that the grand jury which would hear Mrs. X's testimony will
not improperly (even if indirectly) consider it against her spouse by guaran-
teeing that if the government decides to present an indictment against the
nonwitness spouse, it will do so to a different grand jury which will not be
given Mrs. X's grand jury testimony; the government's proposed investigative/
prosecution strategy, by asking that Mrs. X be ordered to testify against a co-
conspirator who may or may not subsequently testify against her nonwitness
spouse, does not violate the letter or spirit of the marital privilege; and the
government should not be required to immunize the nonwitness spouse as a
condition precedent for requiring the witness to testify against a third-party
co-conspirator.
Id. at 315-16 (footnote omitted).
149. Snoonian, 502 F.2d at 113. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a wit-
ness-spouse's conviction for contempt, for refusing to testify before a grand jury inves-
tigating extortionate extensions of credit. The nontestifying spouse was not a target of
the investigation. In 1974, the court noted:
a dearth of precedent as to how closely the supposedly endangered spouse
must be the 'target' of the grand jury's investigation before the privilege may
be invoked . . . . It is also unclear how obviously the questions asked one
spouse must adversely affect the interests of the other spouse to warrant the
former's refusal to respond.
Id. at 112. However, the court noted further that the only purported danger to the
wife was that she had filed a joint tax return. No participation or other knowledge
was alleged. This, plus the government's affidavit that no use of the witness-spouse's
lege since the threat to the nontestifying spouse, a target of the grand
jury investigation, was direct, and the government's promise not to
use the witness-spouse's testimony in a future proceeding provided
no protection against its immediate use by the grand jury.150
In Grand Jury Matter, the court found that the threat to the non-
testifying spouse, a target of the grand jury investigation, was explicit
and clear, and the government's agreement to refrain from naming
the witness' husband in an indictment presented to this particular
grand jury was insufficient to render the testimony nonadverse.151
The government's express intention was to empanel a separate grand
jury to pursue the same investigation, with the objective of the
nonwitness-spouse's indictment. The court found the government's
sole purpose for doing so to be circumvention of the marital privi-
lege.152 The court indicated that speculative or attenuated adverse
impact on the other spouse would not warrant the protection of the
marital privilege,153 but concluded that the adverse impact of the
testimony would be made against the nontestifying spouse, "nullifies any claim of priv-
ilege as grounds for Snoonian's refusal to testify." Id. at 113. See also supra note 140.
150. Malfitano, 633 F.2d at 279. See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text. See
also supra note 117.
151. An important issue in the court's analysis of the spousal testimony sought to
be compelled was the adequacy of the procedural safeguard proposed by the govern-
ment. In the court's view, the government's promise only to refrain from naming the
witness' spouse in an indictment presented to this particular grand jury was a retreat
from an initial offer of immunity contained in an affidavit in support of the original
motion to compel. In re Grand Jury Matter, 673 F.2d at 690. The court emphasized
the original affidavit's certification that "nothing said by the witness before the grand
jury would be used 'either directly or indirectly, against her husband, in any legal pro-
ceedings.'" Id. (emphasis in original). The court cited with apparent approval the dis-
trict court's conclusion "that the Government was attempting to renege on its initial
sworn promise." Id. at 691.
The government affidavit filed in this case was "of the type used in In re
Snoonian." Purdy, supra note 5, at 324 (footnote omitted). Compare supra note 140.
Purdy notes in his discussion of the case that the indirect use of the witness-spouse's
testimony foregone in the government's second affidavit should be construed as relat-
ing only to presenting an indictment against the nontestifying spouse to the grand jury
which had heard the witness-spouse's testimony. Id. at 324 n.107. It is not surprising
that this contention did not succeed with the court of appeals. The language of the
affidavit, the interpretation of that same language in the Snoonian and Malfitano
opinions, and the contents of colloquies before the district court quoted extensively by
both the court in In re Grand Jury Matter and by Purdy in his article, all support the
interpretation of the government's affidavit by the district court and court of appeals.
152. In re Grand Jury Matter, 673 F.2d at 693. The court noted:
Finally, we do not believe that the simple expedient of bringing the hus-
band's indictment before a separate grand jury adequately respects the privi-
lege .... [W]e do not believe that the Government should be permitted to
bootstrap into two proceedings a prosecution based on a single common
scheme for the sole purpose of circumventing the privilege. It would be
anomalous to permit the Government to do indirectly what it is forbidden to
do directly.
Id. at 693 n.11.
153. "Although we agree that in certain circumstances the link between one
spouse's testimony and its potential adverse impact on the other spouse may be too at-
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wife's testimony in the present circumstances was clear:
The only difference that exists in the present case from the Malfitano deci-
sion is that the testimony of the wife here will not directly implicate her hus-
band before the same grand jury before which she is testifying. Rather, it will
indirectly implicate her husband in a future legal proceeding. As such, the ef-
fect is the same; the danger to the marital relationship is as manifest.
1 5 4
Despite the concerns expressed by some commentators that the
definition of adverse spousal testimony following In re Grand Jury
Matter is overbroad,1 55 a review of the cases in which the courts have
refused to compel spousal testimony reveals that the concerns are
unfounded, at least thus far. The opinions discussed above provide
clear criteria for determining whether spousal testimony is suffi-
ciently adverse to warrant the protection of the spousal privilege.
Generally, spousal testimony will not be compelled when the nonwit-
ness-spouse is a defendant in the criminal proceeding or an express
target of the investigation underlying the criminal proceeding.15 6 If
the spousal testimony is indirectly adverse, e.g., testimony concerning
a third party or a specific topic other than the nontestifying spouse,
the link between the testimony sought and its potential adverse im-
pact must be neither speculative nor attenuated.is 7 There appears to
be an implicit presumption that such testimony is not adverse, which
is overcome only by clear evidence to the contrary in the record, 5 8 or
the nature of the specific offense alleged.15 9 Moreover, the witness
tenuated to warrant invocation of the privilege, we do not believe this to be such a
case." Id.
154. Id. at 691 (quoting the lower court's opinion) (emphasis added).
155. See supra note 148.
156. "Target" is defined as "a person as to whom the prosecutor or the grand jury
has substantial evidence linking him to the commission of a crime and who, in the
judgment of the prosecutor is a putative defendant." United States Department of
Justice, United States Attorneys' Manual, tit. 9-11.250 at 12 (1979).
157. See, e.g., supra notes 117 (questions would implicate nonwitness-spouse), and
142-43 (nonincriminating questions differentiated from incriminating questions).
158. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Matter, 673 F.2d at 692 n.10 (colloquy before the
district court).
159. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 664 F.2d at 431-33 (Hill, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). Judge Hill stated:
The majority fails to appreciate the peculiar effect that the probable conspir-
acy indictment has upon any invocation of that [marital] privilege ....
With this setting in mind, it becomes clear that the questions posed to Mrs.
Vannier were not "innocuous," as the government contends and the majority
agrees, but contain potential for providing a link in a chain of evidence which
might be used to convict Mr. Varnier. Under the law of conspiracy, the acts
of one co-conspirator in furtherance of the unlawful agreement are admissible
against all, even in the absence of the other's approval of these overt acts
.... The overt act itself need not be criminal if it is in furtherance of the
has the burden of establishing that the other spouse may be ad-
versely implicated by the testimony.160 The definition of adverse tes-
timony that emerges from these criteria is neither uncertain nor
overbroad.
Finally, spousal testimony otherwise adverse to the nonwitness-
spouse may be rendered non-adverse by the procedural safeguard of
immunity, and thus fall outside the protection of the marital privi-
lege. The uses of immunity have rarely been absent from the analy-
ses of the courts concerned with the definition of the marital
privilege. The Hawkins rule's rejection of voluntary spousal testi-
mony had involved the courts in discussion of the grant of immunity
to the witness-spouse. 16 1 In the decade before Trammel, at least two
circuits, ruling that spousal testimony could be compelled, cited as
partial justification the fact that both spouses had been immu-
nized. 162 After Trammel, as an increasingly clear definition of ad-
verse testimony emerged, a grant of use-fruits immunity to the
nonwitness-spouse has concomitantly been advocated as the solution
to "a difficult question concerning the proper scope of the
privilege."163
At the present time it is clear that the government may offer to
provide use-fruits immunity to the nonwitness-spouse and expect
that the testimony of the witness-spouse will be compelled. This
grant of immunity insulates the witness-spouse from testifying ad-
versely to the other spouse, constituting "a complete answer to the
claim of marital privilege."'164 However, a suggestion that the court
grant use-fruits immunity to the nonwitness-spouse, specifically in
the context of the attempted prosecution of a third party, has not
met with approval or emulation by any court.16 5 In effect, the courts'
unlawful agreement . . . and it may occur before or after the others join the
conspiracy.
Id. at 431-32 (citations omitted).
Judge Hill's analysis further explains the court's reluctance to compel adverse testi-
mony in Mafitano, and is supported by the court's comments in that case. See supra
note 118.
160. In re Grand Jury Matter, 673 F.2d at 694 n.12 ("If ... the Government con-
cedes that the nonwitness spouse is a target of the investigation, or if the witness
otherwise meets the burden of establishing that the other spouse may be adversely im-
plicated by the required testimony," the testimony will not be compelled, or use-fruits
immunity will be granted. Id. (emphasis added)).
161. See, e.g., Trammel, 445 U.S. at 42-43.
162. Ryan, 568 F.2d at 543 (Seventh Circuit; see supra notes 64-65 and accompany-
ing text); United States v. Doe, 478 F.2d 194, 195 (1st Cir. 1973) (where both spouses
are granted immunity they can no longer invoke the privilege against adverse spousal
testimony).
163. In re Grand Jury Matter, 673 F.2d at 695 n.12.
164. Malfitano, 633 F.2d at 281 (Gibbons, J., concurring).
165. In re Grand Jury Matter, 673 F.2d at 694 n.12. Judge Rosenn, in a footnote to
the majority opinion, proposed court conferral of use-fruits immunity on the witness'
spouse:
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grant of use-fruits immunity coextensive with the scope of the privi-
lege would equate the marital privilege with the privilege against
self-incrimination. 16 6 Since the marital privilege is not absolute and
has never been independently granted constitutional status, the fail-
ure of this proposal is not surprising.1 67 Nonetheless, the courts' rec-
ognition of the grant of use-fruits immunity by the government as
both necessary and sufficient to warrant the compulsion of testimony
otherwise protected by the marital privilege suggests the extension of
a right against incrimination to the marital relationship that is like
the constitutional right against self-incrimination in nature, if not in
scope. This suggests the importance the courts continue to place on
the peculiarly confidential relations of husband and wife in which the
marital privilege has long been grounded.
D. The Scope of the Marital Relationship
The courts have long conditioned the protection of the marital
privilege on the existence of a legally valid marriage, not entered into
I believe that the district court can respect the witness' privilege against ad-
verse spousal testimony without also interfering with the Government's at-
tempted prosecution of the third party, about whose activity the wife is being
asked to testify. Writing in concurrence in Malfitano, Judge Gibbons recog-
nized that the district court has the inherent authority to confer use-fruits im-
munity on the witness' spouse .... In other words, the court has the power
to order that neither the witness' testimony, nor the fruits thereof, can be
used in any subsequent prosecution against her husband. Once the wife's tes-
timony is immunized, the Government bears the burden in any subsequent
prosecution of establishing that the evidence it proposes to use against the
husband is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of his wife's
testimony.. . . The wife's testimony can then be compelled without abrogat-
ing the privilege.
Id (citations omitted). Judge Sloviter, who concurred in all but Judge Rosenn's foot-
note 12, criticized the proposal as an invitation for the courts to intrude into an area
more appropriately left to prosecutorial discretion. Id. at 695-96 (Sloviter, J., concur-
ring). See also Purdy, supra note 5, at 325-27 (government forced to risk virtually un-
limited immunization of nonwitness-spouse).
166. See Note, supra note 20, at 132 n.70, 136 n.91 ("By applying this analysis to the
case at hand, the court apparently has treated the marital privilege as co-extensive
with the privilege against self-incrimination-an extraordinary analogy in view of the
reverence that constitutional privilege is accorded and the relative disdain with which
the marital privilege is often viewed." Id. at 136 n.91).
167. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 664 F.2d at 429-30 (rejecting assertion that the
marital privilege is co-extensive with the constitutional privilege against incrimina-
tion); Snoonian, 502 F.2d at 112-13 (the scope of the marital privilege has never been
construed as absolute); But see In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 664 F.2d at 431 (Hill, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (under the peculiar circumstances of a con-
spiracy involving both husband and wife... the privileges against adverse spousal tes-
timony and against self-incrimination are co-extensive).
for fraudulent purposes.168 In the years before the Supreme Court
disestablished the involuntary bar on spousal testimony in Trammel,
the courts created an exception to admit voluntary spousal testimony,
evading the Hawkins rule, where they were able to determine that
no substantive marriage relationship existed.169 When the Supreme
Court validated the courts' practice in Trammel, the Court also in ef-
fect appears to have established its inverse corollary: adverse spousal
testimony will not be compelled where that testimony falls within
the boundaries of a legally valid and substantively viable marital re-
lationship. The exception based on the absence of a substantive mari-
tal relationship has effectively been subsumed in the post-Trammel
rule in accordance with the Court's virtual equation of voluntary tes-
timony and the absence of the protected relationship.170
Since Trammel, the protection of the marital privilege continues to
be terminated when the marriage ends or is found to be invalid.171
The right of a presently-married spouse to invoke the protection of
the marital privilege with regard to matters occurring prior to the
marriage is less well settled. In the context of a marital relationship
apparently accepted as valid, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in
one case has promulgated a general rule that the protection of the
marital privilege does not extend to present testimony about matters
occurring prior to marriage.172 However, no other circuits have fol-
lowed the Seventh Circuit in so ruling, and the case itself is unclear
as precedent, since a pre-marriage exclusion is one of two independ-
ent grounds cited as the basis for the compulsion of testimony, and
the precedent the court cites is equivocal.173
168. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
171. See, e.g., United States v. Klayer, 707 F.2d 892 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
180 (1983) (privilege ended with divorce); United States v. Snyder, 707 F.2d 139 (5th
Cir. 1983) (no privilege where parties merely living together).
172. United States v. Clark, 712 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1983). The court affirmed the
criminal contempt conviction of the defendant for refusing to testify at the trial of his
wife for her participation in a crime for which he had already been convicted. The
marriage occurred after the alleged crime and prior to the trial. The court found "no
evidence that [the] marriage was a sham," but stated:
Although it is true that Van Drunen created the premarriage acts excep-
tion because of a concern with collusive marriages, there is nothing in the
opinion to suggest that the exception applies only when there is evidence
presented of a collusive marriage. By imposing a general rule that the privi-
lege does not cover premarriage acts, courts can avoid mini-trials on the issue
of the sincerity of the parties in getting married.
Id. at 302.
173. The court examined three reasons for refusing to apply the marital privilege:
joint participation in the underlying offense ("the exception which most clearly
defeats" the assertion of the privilege); testimony about conduct prior to marriage; and
facially exculpatory testimony. Id. at 300. The precedent chiefly relied upon was the
Proposed Draft Rule that was never adopted. See supra notes 71, 145 and accompany-
ing text.
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Although it is questionable whether a presently-married spouse
may be compelled to testify about matters which occurred prior to
marriage, several recent cases suggest that past testimony of the
spouse, prior to the marriage, does not fall within the scope of the
marital privilege. In United States v. Barlow,174 the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that testimony of the defendant's wife before a
grand jury prior to her marriage could be admitted against the de-
fendant at his trial, even though the defendant's wife had properly
invoked the marital privilege and could not be compelled to tes-
tify. 1 7 5 At least one district court in the Ninth Circuit has followed
Barlow to admit premarriage grand jury testimony of one spouse ad-
verse to the other.176 In both cases, the court determined that the
grand jury testimony met three criteria for admissibility. First, the
witness-spouse was "unavailable" because she properly invoked the
marital privilege, and could not be compelled to testify.177 Second,
the grand jury testimony possessed "circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness. 1 78 Finally, admission of the grand jury testimony
174. 693 F.2d 954 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2124 (1983).
175. Id. at 960-63. In Barlow, the court affirmed the defendant's conviction for con-
spiracy and theft from interstate shipment. Prior to her marriage to the defendant,
the prospective witness-spouse had given testimony to the grand jury contradicting his
alibi. Id. at 957. Neither the defendant nor the witness-spouse testified at the trial.
176. United States v. Marchini, No. LV 84-15 HEC (D. Nev. 1984), appeal docketed
No. - (9th Cir. 1984). Defendant Marchini was convicted of criminal tax offenses. At
trial, the witness-spouse invoked her marital privilege not to testify against the defend-
ant; the defendant testified. Following Barlow, the court admitted grand jury testi-
mony of Mrs. Marchini, given prior to her marriage to the defendant, concerning
accounting and bookkeeping practices of the defendant's business where she had been
employed during the period of the alleged offenses.
177. Barlow, 693 F.2d at 961-62.
We believe that under certain circumstances grand jury testimony can be
properly admitted under the Federal Rules of Evidence. In determining
whether grand jury testimony of a government witness is admissible under
Rule 804(b)(5) the trial court first must ascertain whether the witness is "un-
available" within the meaning of the Rule. If a witness "persists in refusing to
testify concerning the subject matter of his statement despite an order of the
court to do so" he is "unavailable" for the purposes of the hearsay rules. Fed.
R. Evid. 804(a)(2). In the case at bar, lantha Humphries was clearly unavaila-
ble. She had planned to exercise her privilege not to testify against her hus-
band, the defendant.
Id.
178. Id. at 962. "Second, the trial court must determine whether the substance of
the grand jury testimony possesses 'circumstantial guarantees of truthworthiness'
equivalent to the other exceptions included in Rule 804." The court found "substan-
tial" circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness in Barlow: as the defendant's pro-
spective wife, the declarant had no motive to implicate the defendant and exculpate
herself; her testimony conveyed information of which she had personal knowledge;
other testimony corroborated the substance of the grand jury testimony. Id.
served the "purposes of the [rules of evidence] and the interests of
justice. ... 179 The court in Barlow, while noting that for purposes
of the protection of the marital privilege the present marriage was
not a sham, nonetheless found the defendant's marriage to the pro-
spective witness prior to trial to be a factor the "court may consider"
with respect to the last criterion. 80
The scope of the marital privilege defined in these cases appears to
be co-extensive with the substantive marital relationship. No ques-
tion was raised in either of these cases of the participation of the pro-
spective witness-spouse in the alleged crime, nor of the adversity of
the testimony sought, nor of the existence of a valid and viable mar-
riage at the time the testimony was sought. Absent the availability of
one of these exclusions, the clear implication is that the privilege
here also is grounded in the confidential relations of husband and
wife. Present relations are protected by the spouse's privilege to re-
fuse to testify within the scope of these relations. Protection does not
extend into the past any further than the recognized establishment
of the marriage relationship.18
V. CONCLUSION: THE EMERGENCE OF A UNIFIED
MARITAL PRIVILEGE
Echoing the predictions of the commentators, many of the courts
defining the marital privilege since Trammel have referred to the
disfavor into which the privilege has fallen and the continued erosion
of its protection, whether against compelled adverse spousal testi-
mony, or against the revelation of confidential marital communica-
tions.182 In fact, an examination of the rulings of the federal courts
on the marital privilege since Trammel reveals the emergence of an
increasingly unified, coherent privilege.
The process began with Trammel, where the Supreme Court fi-
nally rejected the ancient cultural construct of spousal incompetency,
grounding a marital privilege against compelled adverse testimony on
the same rationale in which the confidential marital communications
179. Id, (citing Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(5)(C)).
180. Id. The court stated:
We therefore believe the trial court may examine the reasons for the witness'
unavailability. For example, the appellant in the instant case chose to marry
Iantha Humphries before trial which permitted her to assert her marital priv-
ilege. His role in making her unavailable militates in favor of admitting the
grand jury testimony. We do not believe that the marriage was a sham; it was
not and the court below stated so .... We simply state that among the many
factors which a court may consider in determining the admissibility of grand
jury testimony is the extent of the defendant's role in making the witness
unavailable.
Id.
181. Compare supra note 136.
182. See supra note 90.
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privilege had long been based, "the confidence of the marital rela-
tionship . . 'the best solace of human existence.' "183 Although the
courts have continued to discuss the marital privilege as two privi-
leges, in fact they are discussed as aspects of a single zone of privi-
lege, whose borders are those of the substantive marital relationship,
the peculiarly confidential relations of husband and wife. 184 Stated
most simply, the post-Trammel marital privilege vests a right solely
in the prospective witness-spouse to refuse to testify adversely to the
other spouse in a criminal proceeding.185 With the question of volun-
tariness settled, the inquiry of the courts turned to the scope of such
a privilege: under what circumstances, and about what matters may
an unwilling spouse be compelled to testify?
After Trammel, the courts have been concerned with exclusions
from the scope of the marital privilege, rather than exceptions to its
invocation-hence the form of the courts' inquiry. Exceptions had
been created by the federal courts in their frustration with the per-
petuation of spousal incompetency by the Hawkins rule. Each suc-
ceeding opinion in that period may be viewed as a deconstructive
critique of the rule, with the emergent definition of the marital privi-
lege found in the exception created: voluntary testimony,18 6 the ex-
clusion of criminal communications,1 8 7 the uses of immunity,1 88 even
a redefinition of the protected relationship itself. 8 9 With the re-
moval of the Hawkins bar, the exceptions in effect became the rule.
That the exceptions were subsumed into a rule is precisely the evolu-
tion of the marital privilege traced here; such development has re-
sulted in the emergence of an increasingly coherent and unified
marital privilege.
Moreover, the coherent marital privilege after Trammel has em-
braced the privilege that developed separately protecting confidential
183. Trammel, 445 U.S. at 51 (quoting Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) at 223).
184. See, e.g., Neal, 743 F.2d at 1447 (Logan, J., concurring) ("The privilege against
adverse spousal testimony and the privilege for confidential marital communications
are closely related; both are intended to protect marital confidences,"); id at 1449
(Jenkins, J., concurring) ("The twin facets of the rule suggested by the court-the
privilege and the Crime-Fraud exception [sic]--assume the existence in fact of a confi-
dential communication"); United States v. Nelson, 485 F. Supp. 941 (W.D. Mich. 1980)
(discusses "two distinct privileges," but subsumes both in a right to privacy).
185. See, e.g., Malfitano, 633 F.2d at 277 ("The crux of this privilege is that a person
may not be forced to be a witness against his or her spouse in a criminal proceeding.").
186. See supra notes 98-115 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 116-36 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 137-67 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 168-81 and accompanying text.
marital communications. The scope of the marital privilege is the
same, whether the courts are ruling on the compulsion of spousal tes-
timony, or the admission of marital communications. In the refusal
to compel spousal testimony, protection is extended to prospective
confidential communications; in the refusal to admit confidential
marital communications, protection is extended to prior confidential
relations.'9 0 The phenomenological formulation differs in tense but
not in substance-what is protected by the marital privilege is the
substantive marital relationship described by the Supreme Court
nearly a century ago as the peculiarly confidential relations of hus-
band and wife. The emergence of the marital privilege as a single
phenomenological formulation is the result of a deconstructive pro-
cess, the case by case analysis in the light of reason and experience
that focuses on the grounds of the system's possibility.1g1
The definition of the privilege is dynamic, rather than static; the
mandate of the light of reason and experience is an ongoing decon-
structive process. The starting point in the common law for the
deconstructive analysis is not a natural given, but a cultural con-
struct. The outmoded cultural construct of spousal incompetency
was once the logical and rhetorical ground of the marital privilege.
With its erosion and disapproval, the confidential relations of hus-
band and wife have increasingly been grounded by the courts in the
emergent cultural construct of the right to privacy.' 92 At the present
time, the marital privilege and an implicit right to privacy stand in a
referential relation to each other, finding a common phenomenal
ground in the substantive marital relationship. 93 While privacy in-
190. Compare supra notes 136, 181 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 29, 32, 36, 64-65, 77-78 and accompanying text. Compare supra
notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
193. The Supreme Court has developed the right of privacy by explicit reference to
the marital relationship, most prominently in Griswold v. Connecticut: "We deal with
a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights-older than our political parties, older
than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hope-
fully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred." Griswold, 381 U.S. 479, 486
(1965); and Roe v. Wade: "[T]he court has recognized that a right of personal privacy,
or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution."
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (citing six cases in addition to Griswold that
"make it clear that the right has some extension to activities relating to marriage
. .. "). In an extended discussion of the marital privilege in United States v. Nelson,
the court stated:
[The] protection of the family, and of marital relationships, is one of the high-
est priorities of the law. As Justice Harlan wrote in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497... "The home derives its pre-eminence as the seat of family life and the
integrity of that life is something so fundamental that it has been found to
draw to its protection of the principles of more than one explicitly granted
Constitutional right .... Of this whole private realm of family life it is diffi-
cult to imagine what is more private, or more intimate than a husband and
wife's marital relations."
Nelson, 485 F.2d at 946. See also Comment, The Child-Parent Privilege: A Proposal, 47
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terests have been explicitly protected by the marital privilege,194 the
courts have ventured in very few instances beyond the confidential
relations of husband and wife to provide analogical protection to
other relationships.195
Of course, the rhetorical ground available to the marital privilege
in a right to privacy itself is a cultural construct, no more natural
than its predecessors, equally subject to displacement as a philosophi-
cal category and attempt at formal definition. But that is beyond the
scope of this comment. What has been the focus of this comment is
the persistence of the marital privilege in a single phenomenological
formulation, protecting an irreducible zone of privacy coextensive
with the substantive marital relationship. Grounded in the confiden-
tial relations of husband and wife, a right of privacy older than the
Bill of Rights, the marital privilege will continue to persist. Its fu-
ture formulations, in the light of reason and experience, will depend
on what new possiblities emerge from that fertile ground.
BARBARA GREGG GLENN
FORDHAM L. REV. 771 (1979). The author proposes and develops a child-parent privi-
lege by reference to other testimonial privileges, with special emphasis on the marital
privilege: "[T]he marital privileges['] ... continued vitality indicates a legislative and
judicial determination that invading the privacy of the marital relationship is simply
too high a price to pay for the possible benefits of compelled disclosure." I&. at 778-79.
But see Krattenmaker, supra note 77, at 96-97 ("claims that the Constitution compels
recognition of a marital ... privilege cannot be dismissed cavalierly ... [but] the con-
stitutional marital privilege rests on only sporadic precedent and virtually no devel-
oped doctrine.").
194. "[T]he right to privacy in marriage is protected by way of two distinct privi-
leges." Nelson, 485 F. Supp. at 947.
195. See In re Agosto, 553 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Nev. 1983) (refusal to compel grand
jury testimony of son against father). The Agosto opinion runs to 33 pages, expounding
the historic relations of a right to privacy and testimonial privileges, with particular
emphasis on the marital privilege as the appropriate basis for a parent-child privilege
which replicates its provisions expansively. Citing Malfitano and Trammel, the court
concluded:
Applying this rationale to the case at bar, it is reasonable to hold that Charles
Agosto may claim the parent-child privilege not only for confidential commu-
nications which transpired between his father and himself, but he may like-
wise claim the privilege for protection against being compelled to be a witness
and testify adversely against his father in any criminal proceeding. The par-
ent-child privilege, then, is based not only on the confidential nature of spe-
cific communications between parent and child, but also upon the privacy
which is a constitutionally protectable interest of the family in American
society.
Id. at 1325. But see Matthews v. United States, 714 F.2d 223 (2nd Cir. 1983) (no privi-
lege to refuse testimony that might incriminate in-laws); United States v. Jones, 683
F.2d 817 (4th Cir. 1982) (no privilege of adult child to refuse testimony adverse to his
father, absent confidential communications).

